Utah Law Review
Volume 2016 | Number 5

Article 4

2016

Evading the Schoolhouse Gate: Public Schools
(K-12) and the Regulation of Cyberbullying
Philip Lee

Follow this and additional works at: http://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Education Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law
Commons
Recommended Citation
Lee, Philip (2016) "Evading the Schoolhouse Gate: Public Schools (K-12) and the Regulation of Cyberbullying," Utah Law Review:
Vol. 2016 : No. 5 , Article 4.
Available at: http://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol2016/iss5/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Law Review by an
authorized editor of Utah Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu.

EXPANDING THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC SCHOOLS (K-12)
AND THE REGULATION OF CYBERBULLYING
Philip Lee*
INTRODUCTION
In a tragic case that received international attention, 15-year-old Phoebe Prince
killed herself after being bullied—both physically and online—by some of her
classmates.1 Phoebe had moved to Massachusetts from a small town in Ireland,
enrolling as a freshman at South Hadley High School.2 After a brief relationship with
a popular boy in the senior class, the taunting by her classmates began. Some
students called her an “Irish slut” and a “whore,” knocked things out of her hands,
and sent her threatening texts.3 Some of the students used Facebook and Twitter to
speak badly about her.4 Phoebe suffered this treatment for three months and then
hung herself on the stairwell of her home on January 14, 2010.5 Stories like this led
the Massachusetts legislature to create and implement a comprehensive antibullying law.6
*

© 2016 Philip Lee. Associate Professor of Law, David A. Clarke School of Law,
University of the District of Columbia; B.A., Duke University, 1996; J.D., Harvard Law
School, 2000; Ed.M., Harvard Graduate School of Education, 2012; Ed.D., Harvard
Graduate School of Education, 2013. I am grateful to Bob O’Neil and Sue Lee for their
insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article, to John Brittain for stimulating
discussion on First Amendment issues in schools, and to Stephanie Kawamura for her helpful
research assistance.
1
See Erik Eckholm & Katie Zezima, 6 Teenagers Are Charged after Classmate’s
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/us/30bully.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7SAD-TRBX]. See also Donal Lynch, Bullied to
Death, IRISH INDEPENDENT (Mar. 14, 2010), http://www.independent.ie/lifestyle/bullied-todeath-26640656.html [https://perma.cc/2UPR-JS9K] (describing what happened to Phoebe
Prince).
2
Eckholm & Zezima, supra note 1.
3
Id.
4
See Emily Bazelon, What Really Happened to Phoebe Prince? The Untold Story of
Her Suicide and the Role of the Kids Who Have Been Criminally Charged for It, SLATE (July
20, 2010, 10:13 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/bulle/features/2010/what_really_
happened_to_phoebe_prince/the_untold_story_of_her_suicide_and_the_role_of_the_kids_
who_have_been_criminally_charged_for_it.html [https://perma.cc/W8C4-33GH].
5
Id.
6
See Emily Bazelon, Bullies Beware: Massachusetts Just Passed the Country’s Best
Anti-Bullying Law, SLATE (Apr. 30, 2010, 4:13 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/bulle
/2010/04/bullies_beware.html [https://perma.cc/FM5D-7C3P] (“In response to the suicides
of two of its own kids—Phoebe Prince, 15, from South Hadley and Carl Joseph WalkerHoover, 11, from Springfield—lawmakers unanimously passed a bullying prevention law on
Thursday that is probably the most comprehensive one in the country.”).
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Phoebe Prince was the victim of bullying and cyberbullying. Bullying refers to
“a specific type of aggression in which (1) the behavior is intended to harm or
disturb, (2) the behavior occurs repeatedly over time, and (3) there is an imbalance
of power, with a more powerful person or group attacking a less powerful one.”7
The aggression can be verbal (e.g., persistent name-calling), physical (e.g., hitting),
or psychological (e.g., spreading humiliating rumors).8 In differentiating bullying
from other forms of harmful behavior, Sameer Hinduja and Justin W. Patchin,
observe the following distinctions:
• When someone says or does something unintentionally hurtful and they do
it once, that’s rude.
• When someone says or does something intentionally hurtful and they do it
once, that’s mean.
• When someone says or does something intentionally hurtful and they keep
doing it—even when you tell them to stop or show them that you’re
upset—that’s bullying.9
Cyberbullying is similar to traditional bullying, but it involves the use of
electronic devices and social media platforms to commit this intentional and
repeated aggression—namely verbal and psychological attacks10—against weaker
7

Tonja R. Nansel et al., Bullying Behaviors Among U.S. Youth: Prevalence and
Association with Psychological Adjustment, 285 JAMA 2094, 2094 (2001); see also George
M. Batsche & Howard M. Knoff, Bullies and Their Victims: Understanding a Pervasive
Problem in the Schools, 23 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 165, 165 (1994) (“‘Bullying’ is defined as
a form of aggression in which one or more students physically and/or psychologically (and
more recently, sexually) harass another student repeatedly over a period of time. Typically,
the action is unprovoked and the bully is perceived as stronger than the victim.”) (citations
omitted); Christina Salmivalli, Bullying and the Peer Group: A Review, 15 AGGRESSION &
VIOLENT BEHAV. 112, 112 (2010) (“Bullying is a subtype of aggressive behavior, in which
an individual or a group of individuals repeatedly attacks, humiliates, and/or excludes a
relatively powerless person.”).
8
See Nansel et al., supra note 7, at 2094.
9
SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W. PATCHIN, BULLYING BEYOND THE SCHOOLYARD:
PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO CYBERBULLYING 8 (2014). The authors further note that
“just because something doesn’t necessarily qualify as bullying doesn’t mean that it isn’t
harmful or important to stop.” Id.
10
Insofar as there exists a distinction between speech and action—in that the First
Amendment applies to speech, not action—cyberbullying in most cases (e.g., posting
messages to a social media platform) would be more speech than action. This distinction
between speech and action was suggested in United States v. O’Brien, a case in which the
Court upheld the criminal conviction of a protestor for burning his draft card. 391 U.S. 367,
381–82 (1968) (“For this noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and for nothing else,
[O’Brien] was convicted.”). On the other hand, some forms of offline bullying, like assaults,
theft, or destruction of property would be more action than speech—even if the action meant
to express an idea. See id. at 376 (“We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless
variety of conduct can be labelled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct
intends to thereby to express an idea.”).
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victims.11 For reasons I give in this Article, cyberbullying has some unique
characteristics that make it much more dangerous than offline bullying.12 Indeed,
cyberbullying is so harmful that it should be given diminished First Amendment
protection as schools seek ways to regulate it.
In dealing with cases of bullying and cyberbullying, public primary and
secondary schools—that is, kindergarten through twelfth grade (K–12)13—are
caught in the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, if they do nothing, they face
potential liability under federal civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination based
on sex,14 “race, color, or national origin,”15 and disability.16 On the other hand, if
11

See HINDUJA & PATCHIN, supra note 9, at 11 (defining “cyberbullying” as “willful
and repeated harm inflicted through the use of computers, cell phones, and other electronic
devices.”). Note that these scholars omit the power imbalance element from their definition.
In this Article, I argue that an expanded definition of this element should be included in the
definition. See infra Part V.A.
12
See infra Part IV.A.
13
This Article is about the regulation of cyberbullying at public schools (K-12). It does
not address cyberbullying at private schools because First Amendment protection is
generally not available to their students, unless it can show that these private entities were
acting as state actors. Further, this Article does not address cyberbullying at public colleges
and universities because, as adults, these students are afforded more First Amendment
protection. As I will discuss later, children are treated differently for purposes of the First
Amendment.
14
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides that “[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). School boards may
face liability under Title IX in cases of student-on-student harassment where: (1) the funding
recipient has substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known
sexual harassment occurs; (2) the funding recipient is deliberately indifferent to the
harassment; (3) of which the recipient has actual knowledge; and (4) that harassment is so
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access
to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school. Davis v. Monroe Cty.
Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 638–52 (1999).
15
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits a recipient of federal funds from
discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
The “deliberate indifference” standard for Title VI cases is the same as for Title IX cases.
See Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655, 665 (2d Cir. 2012).
16
Both Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012) and Title
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–34. (2012), prohibit
discrimination on the basis of disability. Courts have imposed liability under these laws
based on the “deliberate indifference” standard. See e.g., Liese v. Indian River Cty. Hosp.
Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 345–48 (11th Cir. 2012) (applying deliberate indifference standard in
determining liability under Section 504); Meagley v. City of Little Rock, 639 F.3d 384, 389
(8th Cir. 2011) (applying deliberate indifference to Title II and Section 504 claims); Duvall
v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001) (“To recover monetary damages under
Title II of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must prove intentional
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schools overreact, they face potential liability for violating their students’ free
speech rights.17 In this Article, I argue that schools should have the authority to
regulate cyberbullying, even if it originates off campus and during nonschool hours.
I contend that this is not an overreaction; indeed, it is a necessary tool to fight the
unique and serious dangers of cyberbullying.18
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I outlines the relevant framework for
regulating student speech in public school settings. Part II explores our current age
of digital expression and its implications for school authority to regulate
cyberbullying—a type of bullying that typically originates off campus using
personal computers and smart phones. Part III describes the five approaches that
courts and legislatures have taken to analyze student speech rights in the digital age
when students use electronic devices off campus to attack or threaten others
associated with campus. Part IV analyzes why schools should be able to regulate
off-campus speech in cases of cyberbullying, focusing on the particular harm that
cyberbullying causes, the inadequacy of other legal remedies to address this harm,
and the reasons why schools are uniquely situated to address this form of studenton-student aggression. Finally, Part V offers three suggestions on how schools
should regulate cyberbullying without running afoul of the First Amendment,
including a clear definition of the term that is consistent with the social science
literature, a clear statement of school jurisdiction to regulate cyberbullying when it
originates off campus, and a proposal for how the Tinker test19 should be thought
about and applied in cases of cyberbullying.
I. STUDENT FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AT PUBLIC SCHOOLS (K–12)
Cyberbullying involves a student using electronic devices to post or send
content intentionally and repeatedly in order to harm a weaker student.20 However,
when a student posts expressive content to social media or sends messages
electronically, that student’s speech rights are implicated. In cases where students
have challenged their school-imposed punishments for attacking others online, they
consistently use First Amendment law as the primary basis for their lawsuits.21 In
this section, I outline the legal framework for student free speech rights at public
schools (K–12).
discrimination on the part of the defendant . . . . We now determine that the deliberate
indifference standard applies.”) (citations omitted).
17
See infra Part III.B–E for analysis of cases in which students bring First Amendment
claims in court after schools discipline them for their speech.
18
See infra Part IV.A.
19
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (holding
that schools cannot regulate the content of student speech unless the speech “would
substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge on the rights of other
students.”).
20
See infra notes 122–123 and accompanying text.
21
See infra Part III.B–E.
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A. Tinker v. Des Moines
The landmark case on student free speech rights at public schools, Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District, was decided by the Supreme
Court in 1969.22 Tinker involved junior and senior high school students in Iowa who
wore black armbands to school in a peaceful political protest of the conflict in
Vietnam.23 These students were suspended in violation of a school policy that
prohibited students from wearing these armbands.24 The Court noted, “First
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”25 The Court recognized that the symbolic act
of wearing black armbands to school was protected as a form of “pure speech,”
which “is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment.”26
As such, the Tinker Court held that “to justify prohibition of a particular
expression of opinion,” school officials must prove that the expression “would
substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other
students.”27 This first test has come to be known as the “substantial disruption test.”28
Later in the opinion, the Court noted that this test could be satisfied with “facts which
might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or
material interference with school activities.”29 In other words, school officials do not
have to wait until substantial disruption or material interference actually occurs
before acting; they just need a reasonable belief that it may occur.30 However, the
22

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505 n.1. (relying on two Fifth Circuit cases that involved high
school students in Mississippi who wore buttons to school protesting the denial of voting
rights to African Americans); see Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1966);
Blackwell v. Issaquena Cty Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 750 (5th Cir. 1966). See Kristi L.
Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Substantial Disruption Tests, 58 AM. U. L. REV.
1129, 1141 (2009), for a fascinating analysis of these two cases.
23
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
24
Id. at 504.
25
Id. at 506. Tinker’s view of a “schoolhouse gate,” presupposes a physically bound
school and does not contemplate online spaces of communication that are linked to schools
in various ways. In this Article, I aim to expand what “schoolhouse gate” means in our digital
age and recommend school authority to regulate such spaces within certain limits. See infra
Parts IV.B and IV.C.
26
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505–06.
27
Id. at 509.
28
The Tinker Court articulated this test in a number of ways, including conduct that
would (1) “substantially interfere with the work of the school,” id. at 509; or (2) cause
“material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline,” id. at 511; or (3)
“materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school,” id. at 513.
29
Id. at 514.
30
Subsequent cases have demonstrated that applying Tinker’s “reasonable forecast of
substantial disruption” is a highly context-specific inquiry. See e.g., LaVine v. Blaine Sch.
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Court warned that school officials must demonstrate something “more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint.”31 The second Tinker test regarding interference with the
rights of others has not been heavily relied on by courts.32
In describing the scope of free speech rights in schools, the Tinker Court did not
restrict it to the classroom, but also included other areas on school grounds by
observing:
A student’s rights . . . do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When
he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the
authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial
subjects . . . if he does so without ‘materially and substantially interfer[ing]
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school’ and without colliding with the rights of others.33
Applying these principles, the Court found that school officials failed to justify its
prohibition on armbands with a showing of either substantial interference with
school activities or impingement on the rights of other students.34 Thus, the students’
Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (“In applying Tinker, we look to the totality of the
relevant facts. We look not only to James’ actions, but to all of the circumstances confronting
the school officials that might reasonably portend disruption.”) (citation omitted); J.S. v.
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 569 Pa. 638, 673 (Pa. 2002) (“Keeping in mind the unique nature
of the school setting and the student’s diminished rights therein, while there must be more
than some mild distraction or curiosity created by the speech, complete chaos is not required
for a school district to punish student speech.”) (citations omitted).
31
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
32
See Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The
precise scope of Tinker’s ‘interference with the rights of others’ language is unclear.”). But
see Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated 127
S. Ct. 1484, 1484 (2007) (holding that school’s prohibition of a student from wearing a Tshirt that stated “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL” was constitutional because the
message contained on the shirt interfered with “the rights of other students.”) The Supreme
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for dismissal of the
appeal of the preliminary injunction as moot because the district court had entered final
judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief. The Ninth Circuit subsequently
dismissed the appeal. Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013)
(applying Tinker’s “interference with the rights of others” test); Harper v. Poway Unified
Sch. Dist., 485 F.3d 1052, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007).
33
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13.
34
Id. at 508 (“The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners for a silent,
passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of
petitioners. There is here no evidence whatever of petitioners’ interference, actual or nascent,
with the schools’ work or of collision with the rights of other students to be secure and to be
let alone. Accordingly, this case does not concern speech or action that intrudes upon the
work of the schools or the rights of other students.”). Note the school officials, in their brief,
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free speech rights in wearing their armbands to school were protected by the First
Amendment.35
B. Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse
Other cases further defined the contours of free speech rights at public schools.
Three subsequent Supreme Court cases, in particular, have created exceptions to the
application of Tinker in student free speech cases.36
First, in Bethel School District v. Fraser,37 a public high school student in the
state of Washington was suspended for giving a speech in a school assembly
attended by 600 students.38 The speech was replete with “an elaborate, graphic, and
explicit sexual metaphor.”39 The student was suspended and removed from the list
of graduation speakers at the school’s commencement exercises.40 The student, by
unsuccessfully argued for a reasonableness standard to be applied in their actions:
The law . . . gives school authorities the right to adopt reasonable rules and
regulations governing the conduct of the pupils. If the regulation is reasonable in
the light of existing facts and circumstances the Court may not question the
discretion vested in the school authorities. It is not for the courts to consider
whether the rule in retrospect was wise or expedient so long as it was a reasonable
exercise of the discretion vested in the school authorities.
Brief for Respondents at 30, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
509 (1969) (No. 21), 1968 WL 94384, at *30 (citations omitted).
35
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (“[The students] neither interrupted school activities nor
sought to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of others. They caused discussion outside
of the classrooms, but no interference with work and no disorder. In the circumstances, our
Constitution does not permit officials of the State to deny their form of expression.”).
36
Lower courts have also created exceptions to Tinker. See, e.g., Guzick v. Drebus, 431
F.2d 594, 597–98 (6th Cir. 1970) (upholding a content-neutral prohibition of students from
wearing any buttons at school in a context of racial conflict, as distinguishable from Tinker).
37
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
38
Id. at 678.
39
Id. The content of the speech was provided in Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion:
I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his
character is firm—but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is
firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary,
he’ll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts—he
drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds. Jeff is a man who
will go to the very end—even the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote
for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president—he’ll never come between you and the best our
high school can be.
Id. at 687. (Brennan, J., concurring).
40
Id. at 678.
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his father, challenged his discipline on free speech grounds.41 The Fraser Court
upheld the school officials’ actions against the student and held it was not a violation
of the First Amendment. The Court observed that part of the educational mission of
public school was “educating our youth for citizenship” and teaching “the
appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their conduct and
deportment in and out of class.”42 It also recognized the in loco parentis43 role of
schools “to protect children—especially in a captive audience—from exposure to
‘sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech.’”44 As such, the Court held, “The First
Amendment does not prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a
vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic
educational mission.”45 It noted that “it was perfectly appropriate for the school to
disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd
conduct is wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school
education.”46 With a nod to Tinker’s concern about infringing on the rights of others,
the Fraser Court also acknowledged the harm the student’s speech would have on
both teachers and students.47 It noted:
The pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser’s speech was plainly offensive to
both teachers and students—indeed to any mature person. By glorifying
male sexuality, and in its verbal content, the speech was acutely insulting
to teenage girl students. The speech could well be seriously damaging to
its less mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on the
threshold of awareness of human sexuality. Some students were reported
as bewildered by the speech and the reaction of mimicry it provoked.48
For these reasons, the school had the legal authority to prohibit “sexually explicit,
indecent, or lewd speech” at school events.49
41

Id. at 679.
Id. at 683.
43
In loco parentis means “in the place of a parent” and describes the early legal
relationship between schools and their students. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *441 (observing that a parent “may delegate part of his parental authority,
during his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and had
such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and
correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed”).
44
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684.
45
Id. at 685.
46
Id. at 685–86.
47
Id. at 683–84.
48
Id. (citation omitted).
49
Id. at 684. Even though Fraser arose at an on-campus event, based on the educational
mission rationale, the Court’s holding should apply to all school events, meaning both events
on school property and off-campus events sanctioned by the school. The educational mission
of public schools would be relevant to both of these contexts.
42
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Second, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,50 Missouri high school
students challenged the principal’s removal of two articles regarding the impact of
divorce on students and the experiences of students with pregnancy from a schoolsponsored newspaper.51 The principal claimed that he removed the articles because
he was concerned about the privacy of some of the people interviewed for the stories
and thought that the sexual content was inappropriate for some of the younger
students in the school.52 The Court, in ruling for the school officials, held that
“educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so
long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”53
Thus, the Court acknowledged that educators are able to prohibit school-sponsored
speech to a greater extent than nonschool sponsored speech.54
Third, in Morse v. Frederick,55 a number of high school students in Alaska,
while watching torchbearers run past their school on their way to the Olympic winter
games, displayed a 14-foot banner bearing the phrase “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”56
The students, who were part of this school-sponsored event, were holding the banner
across the street from the school and could be seen by students on the school side of
the street.57 The principal believed that the banner encouraged illegal drug use, so
she demanded the banner be taken down.58 The only student who refused to comply
with the principal’s demand was subsequently suspended.59 This student challenged
his suspension as a violation of his free speech rights.60 The Supreme Court held that
“a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a
school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug
use.”61 Although this student was engaged in off-campus expression, it did not
50

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Id. at 263–64.
52
Id. at 263.
53
Id. at 273.
54
Id. at 271 (“Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second form
of student expression to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is
designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be
inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not
erroneously attributed to the school. Hence, a school may in its capacity as publisher of a
school newspaper or producer of a school play ‘disassociate itself,’ Fraser, 478 U.S., at 685,
106 S.Ct., at 3165, not only from speech that would ‘substantially interfere with [its]
work . . . or impinge upon the rights of other students,’ Tinker, 393 U.S., at 509, 89 S.Ct., at
738, but also from speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately
researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences.”).
55
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
56
Id. at 397.
57
Id. at 398.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 399.
61
Id. at 403. In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito agreed with the majority’s holding,
51
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matter for the Court’s analysis.62 The Court emphasized that all school-sponsored
and school-supervised activities off campus grounds—such as field trips—were
subject to the school’s rules of conduct.63 In refusing to protect the student’s
expression, the Morse Court noted that the dangers of drug use are “serious and
palpable” and students needed to be protected from such harm.64
In sum, these three cases have carved out exceptions to Tinker. Based on these
exceptions, schools can prohibit student speech in certain situations even if they
cannot demonstrate substantial disruption or interference with the rights of others.
Fraser allows school officials to restrict “lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and
conduct” at school events.65 Hazelwood permits school officials to prohibit schoolsponsored speech on the basis of legitimate pedagogical concerns.66 Finally, Morse
allows school officials to regulate speech at school-sanctioned activities that is
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.67
It is important to note that all four of these landmark cases—Tinker and its three
exceptions—arose on school grounds or at school-sanctioned events. Specifically,
Tinker occurred at high school and junior high campuses, and the Court grounded
its holding in “the special characteristics of the school environment”68 recognizing
that constitutional protections extend within “the schoolhouse gate.”69 Fraser took
place in a high school auditorium, and rested its decision on the understanding that
children had less First Amendment rights at public school than adults do in other
settings.70 Hazelwood was at a high school where students were working on a schoolsanctioned newspaper.71 The Hazelwood Court described Tinker as “address[ing]
educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal expression that happens to occur on
the school premises.”72 Finally, Morse took place across the street from a high school
during a school-sanctioned event.73 By allowing the school to regulate the
but with his understanding that “it provides no support for any restriction of speech that can
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue, including speech on
issues such as ‘the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal
use.’” Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Id. at 445 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Alito
cautioned against a broad reading of the majority’s opinion that “endorse[s] the broad
argument advanced by petitioners and the United States that the First Amendment permits
public school officials to censor any student speech that interferes with a school’s
‘educational mission.’” Id. at 423.
62
Id. at 400–01.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 408.
65
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675–83 (1986).
66
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
67
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403.
68
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
69
Id.
70
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
71
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262.
72
Id. at 271.
73
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397.
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expression, the Morse Court emphasized that the field trip “occurred during normal
school hours,” “was sanctioned by [the principal] ‘as an approved social event or
class trip,’” “[t]eachers and administrators were interspersed among the students and
charged with supervising them,” and the “high school band and cheerleaders
performed.”74
C. Off-Campus Speech and General First Amendment Law
Under general First Amendment principles, and most relevant to this Article,
the Court has decided that certain categories of speech receive either diminished or
no First Amendment protections: (1) “fighting words;”75 (2) certain types of
defamation;76 (3) incitement to imminent lawless action;77 (4) “true threats;”78 and
(5) obscenity.79 If private student speech—i.e., neither sanctioned nor supervised by
the school—occurs off campus, then courts typically apply these categories in
deciding whether or not speech is protected by the First Amendment.80 For example,
in Thomas v. Board of Education,81 a public high school suspended students for
publishing an underground newspaper that the school officials thought distasteful.82
Although the students had written “an occasional article” in the school after classes,
the rest of the publication process, including printing and distribution, had occurred
after school hours and off campus.83 The Second Circuit held that Tinker did not
control because the newspaper was off-campus speech.84 The court applied general
First Amendment law and held the students’ suspensions unconstitutional because
the speech did not fall into any exception to First Amendment protection.85 Also, in
Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board,86 a high school student drew a picture of
74

Id. at 400–01.
Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
76
See NY Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
77
See Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
78
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969); see also Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (analyzing true threats).
79
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
80
See, e.g., Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 617–18 (5th Cir. 2004)
(refusing to apply Tinker and analyzing facts under general First Amendment principles);
Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050–53 (2d Cir. 1979) (same).
81
607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979).
82
Id. at 1045.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 1050 (“The case before us . . . arises in a factual context distinct from that
envisioned in Tinker and its progeny. While prior cases involved expression within the
school itself, all but an insignificant amount of relevant activity in this case was deliberately
designed to take place beyond the schoolhouse gate.”).
85
Id. at 1050–53. But see Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d
821, 829 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that Tinker does apply to a student-published underground
newspaper distributed on school grounds).
86
Porter, 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004).
75
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his school being attacked by missiles, helicopters, and armed assailants.87 The
student placed the drawing in his closet and the school learned of it when the
student’s younger brother inadvertently brought it to school.88 Applying general
First Amendment principles instead of Tinker, the Fifth Circuit determined that the
picture did not fall into the free speech exception of “true threat,”89 and therefore
was protected expression.90
However, unlike the physical drawings at issue in Thomas and Porter, many
free speech cases arise in an electronic and digital context, and it is becoming
increasingly difficult for courts to draw clear lines between on-campus expression,
where Tinker applies, and off-campus expression, where general First Amendment
law applies.91 In the next Part, I analyze how social media is changing the student
speech landscape and how courts have struggled to keep up.
II. SCHOOLS IN THE AGE OF DIGITAL EXPRESSION
A. Expanding the Schoolhouse Gate
Over the last fifty years since Tinker was decided, technology has altered the
landscape of communications in such a way that the Supreme Court’s concept of “at
the schoolhouse gate”92 is becoming difficult to demarcate with physical boundaries.
Tinker presupposed that students’ rights continued as they entered into the physical
space of a school. It, thus, placed First Amendment limits on school speech
regulation in this context. However, the Court did not contemplate the ways in which

87

Id. at 611.
Id.
89
Id. at 616 (“Speech is a ‘true threat’ and therefore unprotected if an objectively
reasonable person would interpret the speech as a ‘serious expression of an intent to cause a
present or future harm.’ The protected status of the threatening speech is not determined by
whether the speaker had the subjective intent to carry out the threat; rather, to lose the
protection of the First Amendment and be lawfully punished, the threat must be intentionally
or knowingly communicated to either the object of the threat or a third person.”) (emphasis
in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d
616 (8th Cir. 2002)).
90
Id. at 617–18.
91
Todd D. Erb, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to Punish OffCampus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 265–66 (2008) (“[I]n most
jurisdictions, even if the ‘intended audience was undoubtedly connected to [the school],’
courts will refuse to address incidents of cyberbullying. Even in the few jurisdictions
applying the ‘sufficient nexus’ test, school districts will struggle to establish the nexus in the
numerous circumstances where the web site content negatively impacts the life of a student
on campus but where it is not accessed at school or carried onto campus.”) (alterations in the
original) (citations omitted) (quoting Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d
1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000)).
92
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
88
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technology would permit schools to transcend the boundaries of any geographic
location.
Indeed, the way both schools and their students are utilizing this technology is
expanding what the “schoolhouse gate” means. For example, many public schools
are employing virtual classrooms in which classes are being taught online.93 These
virtual classrooms are not bounded by physical walls. For example, in some Florida
schools, “e-learning labs” allow “[s]tudents [to] log on to a Web site to gain access
to lessons, which consist mostly of text with some graphics, and they can call, email or text online instructors for help.”94 If these classrooms exist in cyberspace
and the teachers are located off site, but can be reached by electronic devices, it
makes little sense to think about the “schoolhouse gate” as bounded by the
geographic boundaries of the school. School extends far beyond these boundaries.
Moreover, when students use social media, such as Facebook, Instagram, and
Twitter, to communicate outside of school, their ideas may be viewed by anyone
both inside and outside the schoolhouse gate. In Reno v. ACLU,95 Justice John Paul
Stevens presaged the implications of these new technologies, observing almost
twenty years ago, that “[t]hrough the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone
line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from
any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the
same individual can become a pamphleteer.”96
Social media creates this expansive communicative reach for three main
reasons. First, the Internet is widely available and constantly accessed by young
people. Sherry Turkle, in writing about how people engage with technology,
observes:
Teenagers tell me they sleep with their cell phone . . . . The technology has
become like a phantom limb, it is so much a part of them. These young
people are among the first to grow up with an expectation of continuous
connection: always on, and always on them.97
93

Trip Gabriel, More Pupils Are Learning Online, Fueling Debate on Quality, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/education/06online.html
[[https://perma.cc/F92Q-BAB5]; see also Anya Kamenetz, Study in Your PJs? What a High
School ‘Work from Home Day’ Looks Like, NPR (Feb. 23, 2016, 6:37 AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/02/23/466460375/study-in-your-pjs-what-a-highschool-work-from-home-day-looks-like [https://perma.cc/4ACH-TJ24] (“Nationwide, about
400,000 K-12 students are taking or have taken at least one fully online course, and far more
schools are using platforms like Schoology to provide online assignments outside of
traditional school hours.”).
94
Laura Herrera, In Florida, Virtual Classrooms With No Teachers, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan.
17,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/education/18classrooms.html
[https://perma.cc/XTR2-RR7T].
95
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
96
Id. at 870.
97
SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER: WHY WE EXPECT MORE FROM TECHNOLOGY
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According to a recent study from the Pew Research Center that was published in
April 2015, 92% of teenagers—defined in the report as those people between 13 to
17—report going online daily and 24% report going online “almost constantly.”98
According to the study, this “frenzy of access” is facilitated by the widespread use
of smartphones.99 The Pew study finds that 73% of teens have access to
smartphones, which enable access to various social media platforms.100 Facebook is
currently the most popular platform, used by 71% of teenagers, followed by
Instagram (used by 52%), Snapchat (used by 41%), and Twitter (used by 33%).101
Second, social media, with the click of a button, allows a user to quickly send
messages to a large number of people.102 This access is not open for all to see, unless
the user decides that is what she or he wants. The social media audience is typically
defined by the user through invitation-only entry points, such as “friend” requests,
and a number of user-controlled privacy settings.103 Nonetheless, many social media
platforms can greatly enhance a student’s ability to publicize her views to many
people. For example, Facebook enables its users to post messages, pictures, and
videos onto sections of their online profiles called “timelines,” which generally can
be viewed by the user’s Facebook “friends.”104 Facebook further permits users to
interact with each other by sharing information on their timelines.105 This application
also lets users send personal messages to each other,106 tag each other so that users
AND LESS FROM EACH OTHER 16–17

(2011).
Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015, PEW RES. CTR.
(Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/teens-social-media-technology2015/ [https://perma.cc/4BPZ-HHXH].
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. At the time of this study, these social media platforms were reported to be the
most popular. Id. However, with the continual invention of new platforms, the most
frequently used ones are constantly changing. For the purposes of this Article, I have focused
on the most popular forms of social media reported both in the Pew Study and in court cases
centering on school discipline for social media usage.
102
Paris S. Strom & Robert D. Strom, When Teens Turn Cyberbullies, EDUCATION
DIGEST, Dec. 1, 2005, at 35, 36 (“Instead of remaining a private matter or event known by
only a small group, text or photographs can be communicated to a large audience in a short
time.”).
103
For example, Facebook users can currently adjust their privacy settings to restrict
who can see their posts, who can contact them, and who can search for them. See Basic
Privacy Settings & Tools, FACEBOOK.COM: HELP CENTER, https://www.facebook.com/help/
325807937506242/ https://perma.cc/AJ7P-MVRY. Facebook also allows user to block
specific users from viewing their content. Id.
104
See How Do I Post to My Timeline?, FACEBOOK.COM: HELP CENTER,
https://www.facebook.com/help/1462219934017791 [https://perma.cc/8K8S-9WDN].
105
Id.
106
See Who Can I Send Messages To?, FACEBOOK.COM: HELP CENTER,
https://www.facebook.com/help/438779846195810 [https://perma.cc/WXD8-UFW3].
98
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are notified when something is posted about them,107 and start online chats with
single or multiple users.108 Another application, Snapchat, allows its users to take a
photo or video, add a caption, and send it to other users.109 This “Snap” disappears
from the screen unless the recipient takes a screenshot of it.110 Finally, Twitter allows
its users to send and read short 140-character messages, called “tweets.”111 Twitter
users register for accounts and can follow other users’ accounts.112 The tweets from
the followed accounts populate the followers’ Twitter home pages in a live message
feed.113 Twitter also enables users to “retweet” other users’ tweets.114 Based on these
capabilities, Twitter messages can quickly reach large numbers of people.
Third, social media facilitates mass participation in collective dialogues in
virtual communities of interest. As mentioned, Facebook allows users to “friend”
each other, and the posts of Facebook friends will appear on their respective news
feeds,115 thereby creating an online community of people updating each other with
all types of information. Moreover, Instagram allows its users to:

107

See Tagging, FACEBOOK.COM: HELP CENTER, https://www.facebook.com/help/2326
20513462357 [https://perma.cc/UK7V-85K4].
108
See How Do I Start Chatting with a Friend?, FACEBOOK.COM: HELP CENTER,
https://www.facebook.com/help/193822797331287 [https://perma.cc/9QJT-U6GY].
109
See Create and Send Snaps, Subtopic in Snapchat Support, SNAPCHAT,
https://support.snapchat.com/en-US/article/create (on file with Utah Law Review).
110
Id.
111
See Using Twitter: The Basics: Posting a Tweet, TWITTER.COM: HELP CENTER,
https://support.twitter.com/articles/15367-posting-a-tweet# [https://perma.cc/F9C4-VDH6].
In addition to text, tweets can contain photos and videos as well. See id.
112
An account on Twitter is designated: “@[username].” See Using Twitter: The
Basics: Signing Up, TWITTER.COM: HELP CENTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/1009
90# [https://perma.cc/95L6-Y9YH]. Note that users can currently block other users from
following them if they so choose. See Using Twitter: The Basics: Customizing Your
Experience, TWITTER.COM: HELP CENTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/117063blocking-users-on-twitter# [https://perma.cc/MG2D-4QXN].
113
See Using Twitter: The Basics: Tweeting: Posting a Tweet, TWITTER.COM: HELP
CENTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/15367# [https://perma.cc/2LBN-4PJP].
114
Using Twitter: The Basics: Tweeting: Retweeting Another Tweet, TWITTER.COM:
HELP CENTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/20169873# [https://perma.cc/W453ABZ9].
115
How Does News Feed Decide Which Stories to Show?, FACEBOOK.COM: HELP
CENTER, https://www.facebook.com/help/166738576721085 [https://perma.cc/GX99MN4R] (“The stories that show in your News Feed are influenced by your connections and
activity on Facebook. This helps you to see more stories that interest you from friends you
interact with the most. The number of comments and likes a post receives and what kind of
story it is (ex: photo, video, status update) can also make it more likely to appear in your
News Feed.”).
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Take a picture or video, then customize it with filters and creative tools.
Post it on Instagram and share instantly on Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr and
more—or send it directly as a private message. Find people to follow based
on things you’re into, and be part of an inspirational community.116
Additionally, Twitter is known for its hashtags that can bring attention to various
issues and engage people in online communication around common themes.117 A
hashtag is a word or phrase preceded by the hash or pound sign (#) that social media
users can use to identify messages on specific topics.118 Hashtags were created
organically by Twitter users as a means to search for tweets based on message
content.119 When social media users tweet and retweet messages with the same
hashtags, these hashtags start to trend, and the issues that these messages are
connected to become more visible to the public.120
For these reasons, social media is an incredibly powerful tool for student
expression. Also for these reasons, when social media is being used by students, the
distinction between on-campus and off-campus speech is not easily made. As one
judge has noted, digital communication appears to be “everywhere at once.”121 This
is particularly problematic when students abuse social media to bully their fellow
students.
B. Bullying in the Digital Age
The increasing societal awareness of bullying and cyberbullying—particularly
after a number of highly publicized suicides of young students across the

116

Instagram App of the Day, CITRUSBITS: BLOG (Aug. 18, 2015),
https://citrusbits.com/instagram-app-of-the-day/ [https://perma.cc/5GPX-84HP].
117
See Using Twitter: The Basics: Tweeting: Using Hashtags on Twitter,
TWITTER.COM: HELP CENTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/49309-using-hashtags-ontwitter# [https://perma.cc/9794-FQPY].
118
See id.
119
See id.
120
Using Twitter: Beyond the Basics: More about Twitter: FAQS about Trends on
Twitter,
TWITTER.COM:
HELP
CENTER,
https://support.twitter.com/groups/53discover/topics/216-trends/articles/101125-faqs-about-trends-on-twitter# [https://perma.cc
/6WSF-FA82] (“Trends are determined by an algorithm and, by default, are tailored for you
based on who you follow and your location. This algorithm identifies topics that are popular
now, rather than topics that have been popular for a while or on a daily basis, to help you
discover the hottest emerging topics of discussion on Twitter that matter most to you.”).
121
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011)
(Smith, J., concurring).
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country122—has spurred state lawmakers to act.123 Indeed, as of January 2016, all
fifty states, along with the District of Columbia, have enacted anti-bullying laws.124
The requirements of anti-bullying laws differ by state.125 Common elements of these
laws require or encourage schools to develop an anti-bullying policy, implement
anti-bullying training programs, and report bullying to authorities and institute
appropriate disciplinary action when it occurs.126 Most statutes incorporate Tinker’s
“substantial disruption” and “interference with the rights of others” tests along with
122

See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, Girl’s Suicide Points to Rise in Apps Used by
Cyberbullies, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/us/suicideof-girl-after-bullying-raises-worries-on-web-sites.html
[https://perma.cc/PM4U-7AEB]
(discussing 12-year-old Rebecca Ann Sedwick’s suicide after being cyberbullied); John
Halligan, Death by Cyber-Bully, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 17, 2005), http://www.boston.com/news
/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/08/17/death_by_cyber_bully/ [https://perma.cc/
YJL7-G524] (Ryan Halligan’s father discussing his 13-year-old son’s suicide after enduring
online bullying and lauding Massachusetts for adopting a pilot program to prevent all forms
of student harassment in the commonwealth’s schools); Helen Kennedy, Phoebe Prince,
South Hadley High School’s ‘New Girl,’ Driven to Suicide by Teenage Cyberbullies, DAILY
NEWS (March 29, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/phoebe-prince-southhadley-high-school-new-girl-driven-suicide-teenage-cyber-bullies-article-1.165911 [https://
perma.cc/PJ7M-J2S9] (discussing 15-year-old Phoebe Prince’s suicide after she was
cyberbullied); Felicia R. Lee, The Rough-and-Tumble Online Universe Traversed by Young
Cybernauts, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/22/arts/tele
vision/22front.html [https://perma.cc/Q9P4-AVCA] (discussing Ryan Halligan’s suicide
after enduring online bullying); Yvonne Wenger, Teen’s Suicide Raises Long-Standing
Concerns about Cyber-Bullying (April 17, 2012), BALTIMORE SUN, http://articles.baltimore
sun.com/2012-04-17/news/bs-md-ho-cyber-suicide-20120417_1_cyber-bullying-debpoquette-cyberbullying-research-center [https://perma.cc/687Y-43QA] (discussing 15-yearold Grace McComas’s suicide after being cyberbullied); Yalanda Young, Online Teasing
Leads to Teen’s Suicide (Nov. 24, 2009), http://www.kait8.com/story/11566204/onlineteasing-leads-to-teens-suicide [https://perma.cc/3AD2-CMQG] (discussing 12-year-old
Sarah Lynn Butler’s suicide after being bullied on MySpace).
123
See Kevin P. Brady, Criminal State Anti-Bullying Statutes: Does Legislative Zeal
Outweigh Constitutional Considerations, 298 EDUC. L. REP. 21, 28–35 (2013), for a multistate overview of how high profile teen suicides created the impetus for new anti-bullying
legislation. As of the writing of this article, federal anti-bullying laws have been proposed
but not enacted. See Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 1966, 111th Cong.
(2009), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr1966/text [https://perma.cc/MD64SND9]; Safe School Improvement Act of 2010, S. 3739, 111th Cong. (2010),
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s3739/text/is [https://perma.cc/R97C-5RWG].
124
See SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W. PATCHIN, STATE CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH
CENTER, STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS: A BRIEF REVIEW OF STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS
AND POLICIES 1 (2016), http://www.cyberbullying.us/Bullying-and-CyberbullyingLaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/JBA3-6KY5] [hereinafter STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS].
125
I have not attempted a survey of every state’s law, but will use examples from certain
states to highlight different approaches. See infra Part III.A–D.
126
STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS, supra note 124, at 2–20.
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the “hostile educational environment” standard arising from federal
antidiscrimination statutes such as Title VI and IX.127 Fourteen states extend school
authority to regulate speech that originates off campus.128
Forty-eight states have enacted laws that restrict harassment using electronic
media, and twenty-three states have passed laws that specifically prohibit
cyberbullying.129 While some anti-bullying statutes criminalize bullying,130 most of
these laws put the onus on schools to develop policies to address the problem.131
Courts have also differed in their analysis of First Amendment principles in
cases of bullying, cyberbullying, and other peer-on-peer attacking. I will highlight
some of the different approaches in the Part III.
III. FIVE APPROACHES TO SCHOOL REGULATION OF HARMFUL OFF-CAMPUS
SPEECH
In determining whether or not schools can regulate off-campus speech under
Tinker, courts and legislatures have adopted five analytic approaches: (1) finding no
authority to regulate off-campus speech;132 (2) making no distinction between oncampus and off-campus speech;133 (3) requiring a sufficient nexus between the offcampus speech and the campus;134 (4) mandating that the off-campus speech
reaching campus be reasonably foreseeable by its creator;135 and (5) limiting school
authority to regulate off-campus speech to situations where there is an identifiable
threat of school violence.136

127

STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS, supra note 124, at 2–20.
STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS, supra note 124, at 1.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
See e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-28B-3 (2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.351 (2015); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 59-63-140 (2014).
133
See e.g., J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d Cir. 2011); see also
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 2015); FL. STAT. § 1006.147 (2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
16 §11 (2015).
134
See e.g., Killion v. Franklin Regional Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D.
Pa. 2001); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1178––1179 (E.D.
Mo. 1998); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 569 Pa. 638, 667 (Pa. 2002); See also NJ STAT.
ANN. § 18A:37-15.3 (West 2015).
135
See e.g., S.J.W. v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 2012);
D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. #60, 647 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir. 2011); Doninger v.
Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. Of Weedsport Cent.
Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1296 (2008). See also N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2015).
136
See e.g., Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2013).
128
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A. The No Authority Approach
The first approach, which I call the “no authority approach,” views a school’s
regulatory authority under Tinker as limited to on-campus or school-sanctioned
speech. Under this approach, a school has no authority to prohibit off-campus speech
that occurs at nonschool-sanctioned activities, apart from using general First
Amendment principals (e.g., regulating fighting words, obscenity, true threats,
incitement, etc.).
Although scholars have argued for this approach,137 most courts have refused
to apply it in their Tinker analysis.138 Many state legislatures, however, have adopted
this approach in their anti-bullying laws.139 For example, Alabama defines
“harassment” for purposes of its anti-bullying law as “[a] continuous pattern of
intentional behavior that takes place on school property, on a school bus, or at a
school-sponsored function.”140 Further, Oregon defines “bullying” as a certain act
that “[t]akes place on or immediately adjacent to school grounds, at any schoolsponsored activity, on school-provided transportation or at any official school bus

137

See e.g., Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive
Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 395, 430 (2011) (“When student speech occurs outside of school
supervision, the speech should receive the same First Amendment protection as a nonstudent’s speech. Speech outside school supervision does not implicate the ‘essential
characteristics’ of the school environment that justify special First Amendment treatment of
student speech.”); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA.
L. REV. 1027, 1102 (2008) (“The application of Tinker’s materially disruptive standard—
regardless of whether it is preceded with an inquiry into whether the speech is properly
labeled ‘on-campus’ or ‘off-campus’ speech—provides little protection to students’
expressive rights. First, many courts are far too deferential to schools’ assertions that the
challenged expressive activity was substantially and materially disruptive to schoolwork or
discipline. Second, and more importantly, the Tinker test is ill-suited to speech in the digital
media. Many off-campus events and activities can distract students from their work, but it
would make no sense to permit schools to serve as a cultural censor.”).
138
See infra Part III.B-E for cases that hold that schools, in certain situations, have
authority to regulate online speech that originates off campus. But see Emmett v. Kent Sch.
Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (“Plaintiff’s [mock website
obituaries created off campus] was not at a school assembly, as in Fraser, and was not in a
school-sponsored newspaper, as in Kuhlmeier. It was not produced in connection with any
class or school project. Although the intended audience was undoubtedly connected to
Kentlake High School, the speech was entirely outside of the school’s supervision or
control.”).
139
See e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-28B-3 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.351 (West 2016);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-140 (2014).
140
ALA. CODE § 16-28B-3 (2016).
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stop.”141 Finally, South Carolina requires “each local school district shall adopt a
policy prohibiting harassment, intimidation, or bullying at school.”142 The statute
provides the following definition:
“School” means in a classroom, on school premises, on a school bus or
other school-related vehicle, at an official school bus stop, at a schoolsponsored activity or event whether or not it is held on school premises, or
at another program or function where the school is responsible for the
child.143
In sum, under the laws of such states as Alabama, Oregon, and South Carolina,
schools do not have the authority to regulate student speech that occurs off campus
at nonschool-sponsored activities.144 Even if the speech substantially disrupts school
activities, schools are powerless to regulate it under their states’ anti-bullying
statutes. Most states’ anti-bullying laws follow this “no authority” approach and
limit school jurisdiction to regulate bullying only if it occurs on-campus or at schoolsponsored events.145
B. The No Distinction Approach
The second approach, which I call the “no distinction approach,” assumes that
Tinker equally applies to both on-campus and off-campus speech. Courts that apply
this approach go directly to the “substantial disruption” analysis regardless of where
the speech originated.146 State legislatures that adopt this approach assume that
schools have jurisdiction over online speech that is created off campus.147
For example, in J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District,148 a middle school
student in Pennsylvania created a fake profile on MySpace—a social networking
site—that made fun of her principal.149 When she created the profile, it was neither
during school hours nor on school grounds.150 The profile was presented as a selfportrayal of an unnamed bisexual middle school principal, but displayed the
141

OR. REV. STAT. § 339.351 (West 2016).
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See ALA. CODE § 16-28B-3 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.351 (West 2016); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 59-63-140 (2016).
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STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS, supra note 124, at 1 (noting that 36 out of 50 states
do not include off-campus behaviors in their definitions of bullying).
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See e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d Cir.
2011).
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See e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147
(West 2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11 (West 2016).
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photograph of the student’s principal that the student obtained through the School
District’s website.151 It contained “crude content and vulgar language, ranging from
nonsense and juvenile humor to profanity and shameful personal attacks aimed at
the principal and his family.”152 The student was suspended and her parents brought
a legal challenge to this discipline on First Amendment grounds.153 The Third Circuit
“assume[d], without deciding,” that Tinker applied to the student’s off-campus
speech.154 It then turned to the “substantial disruption” test, and held that the profile
neither caused a substantial disruption nor created a reasonable forecast of a
substantial disruption.155 The court noted that “the profile, though indisputably
vulgar, was so juvenile and nonsensical that no reasonable person could take its
content seriously, and the record clearly demonstrates that no one did.”156
Some states’ anti-bullying laws have adopted a “no distinction” approach in
dealing with off-campus student expression created online.157 These laws explicitly
include off-campus acts in their definitions of “bullying.” For example, California
defines “bullying” as certain types of “physical or verbal act or conduct, including
communications made in writing or by means of an electronic act.”158 It further
defines “[e]lectronic act” as “the creation or transmission originated on or off the
schoolsite, by means of an electronic device.”159 Similarly, Florida prohibits
“bullying or harassment” in a number of ways, including “[t]hrough the use of data
or computer software that is accessed at a nonschool-related location, activity,
function, or program or through the use of technology or an electronic device that is
not owned, leased, or used by a school district or school.”160 Finally, Vermont
provides, that “bullying” can include an act that “does not occur during the school
day on school property, on a school bus, or at a school-sponsored activity and can
be shown to pose a clear and substantial interference with another student’s right to
access educational programs.”161
In short, states such as California, Florida, and Vermont make no distinction
between on-campus and off-campus speech for purposes of regulating
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cyberbullying.162 Many states that allow for school regulation of off-campus speech
do it in ways similar to these states.163
C. The Nexus Approach
The third approach, which I call the “nexus approach,” treats online expression
as on-campus speech when it is made off campus, but either aimed at a specific
school or subsequently brought to or accessed on campus.
For example, in J.S. ex. rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District,164 a middle
school student in Pennsylvania created a personal website, titled “Teacher Sux,” on
a home computer that contained threatening and derogatory comments about his
algebra teacher and the school’s principal.165 On one of the web pages, the student
listed reasons why the teacher must die and asked for twenty dollars to help pay for
the hitman.166 Another page contained a drawing of the teacher’s severed head.167
J.S. told other students about this website and accessed it at school to show another
student.168 The school subsequently expelled the student.169 The student’s parents
challenged their son’s expulsion on First Amendment grounds.170 The first issue for
the court was whether this website that was created from home was on-campus or
off-campus speech.171 If it was on-campus speech, Tinker would apply, but if it was
off-campus, only general First Amendment law would apply. The court found “a
sufficient nexus between the website and the school campus to consider the speech
as occurring on-campus.”172 It held, “[W]here speech that is aimed at a specific
school and/or its personnel is brought onto the school campus or accessed at school
by its originator, the speech will be considered on-campus speech.”173 The court then
162

See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West
2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11 (West 2016).
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See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d (West 2016) (authorizing schools to
“prohibit bullying . . . outside of the school setting . . .”); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2723.7 (West 2016) (defining one form of bullying as “through the transmission of information
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program or from the use of technology or an electronic device that is not owned, leased, or
used by a school district”); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-A (West 2016) (stating
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applied Tinker, and found that the school made an adequate showing that the website
caused actual substantial disruption of the work of the school.174 It noted that the
most significant disruption was the emotional and physical injuries suffered by the
algebra teacher that forced her to take a medical leave of absence.175 It further noted
the disruption to the students’ educational environment and parents’ weakened sense
of school safety.176 Other courts have expanded the nexus and applied the Tinker
analysis where off-campus speech makes its way to campus, even if by some other
student.177
Few state legislatures have incorporated a nexus approach, but New Jersey’s
anti-bullying statute has come close.178 It provides that schools should have
jurisdiction over “harassment, intimidation, or bullying . . . that occurs off school
grounds, in cases in which a school employee is made aware of such actions.”179
Illinois is another example.180 The Illinois law provides that the use of electronic
devices for bullying shall be prohibited “only in cases in which a school
administrator or teacher receives a report that bullying through this means has
occurred.”181 Both New Jersey’s and Illinois’s laws are looser than a nexus approach
because the expression does not have to be aimed at or actually reach campus. A
school employee’s knowledge of the content would satisfy both states’
requirements.182
D. The Foreseeability Approach
The fourth approach, which I call the “foreseeability approach,” makes Tinker
applicable to instances in which social media expression is made off campus, but
only when it is reasonably foreseeable that the expression would reach campus.
174

Id. at 868–69. The court also found, under general First Amendment law that the
website did not rise to the level of “true threat.” Id. at 859–60.
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See, e.g., Killion v. Franklin Regional Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D.
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unknown person, Tinker applies.”); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d
1175, 1178–79 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (applying the Tinker analysis to student’s personal webpage
when other students accessed it at school).
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At the time of the writing of this article, administrators at a New Jersey high school
were investigating a bullying complaint under the State’s anti-bullying law after a student’s
Twitter posts came to the attention of school officials. See Liam Stack, Tweets About Israel
Land New Jersey Student in Principal’s Office, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/07/nyregion/anti-israel-tweets-land-new-jersey-studentin-principals-office.html?smid=fb-nytimes&smtyp=cur&_r=0
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For example, in Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport Cent. School
Dist.,183 a middle school student in upstate New York sent instant messages (“IMs”)
from his home computer to 15 members of his “buddy list.”184 The student’s IM icon
showed a small drawing of a pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head, above which
were red dots representing blood, and beneath which were the words, “Kill Mr.
VanderMolen,” who was the student’s English teacher.185 The icon was not sent to
the teacher or any school official, but was viewable for three weeks by the student’s
“buddies,” some of which were fellow students at the school.186 The school
subsequently suspended the student for a semester and the student’s parents
challenged the discipline in court as a violation of their son’s First Amendment
rights.187 In determining that the speech at issue was on-campus speech, the Second
Circuit held that Tinker applies to digital communications as long as there is a
“reasonably foreseeable risk that the icon would come to the attention of school
authorities.”188 Due to “[t]he potentially threatening content of the icon and the
extensive distribution of it,” the court concluded that the risk of the speech coming
to the attention of school authorities was “at least foreseeable to a reasonable person,
if not inevitable.”189 The court further held that once the icon was made known to
school officials, it would “foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within
the school environment.”190
The Second Circuit again adopted this foreseeability approach in Doninger v.
Niehoff.191 In Doninger, a high school student in Connecticut was upset with school
officials’ decision to postpone a battle-of-the-bands concert that she helped
organize, so she blogged about it on her personal website during nonschool hours.192
On this publicly accessible site, she called school officials “douchebags,”
mischaracterized the school’s decision to change the date as a cancellation, and
183

494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1296 (2008).
Id. at 36. The student “was using AOL Instant Messaging (‘IM’) software on his
parents’ home computer. Instant messaging enables a person using a computer with Internet
access to exchange messages in real time with members of a group (usually called ‘buddies’
in IM lingo) who have the same IM software on their computers. Instant messaging permits
rapid exchanges of text between any two members of a ‘buddy list’ who happen to be online at the same time. . . .The AOL IM program, like many others, permits the sender of IM
messages to display on the computer screen an icon, created by the sender, which serves as
an identifier of the sender, in addition to the sender’s name. The IM icon of the sender and
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between the two ‘buddies,’ and each can copy the icon of the other and transmit it to any
other ‘buddy’ during an IM exchange.” Id. at 35–36.
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encouraged students and parents to voice their complaints to the school.193 Students
and parents subsequently called and emailed the school to protest the cancellation.194
After learning about the blog post, the school’s principal concluded that the student’s
conduct “had failed to display the civility and good citizenship expected of class
officers.”195 On this basis, the school prohibited the student from running for senior
class secretary.196 This student’s parents challenged this discipline as a violation of
their daughter’s First Amendment rights.197 Citing to Wisniewski, the Second Circuit
held, “We have determined . . . that a student may be disciplined for expressive
conduct, even conduct occurring off school grounds, when this conduct ‘would
foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment,’ at
least when it was similarly foreseeable that the off-campus expression might also
reach campus.”198 In applying this rule, even though the blog post was created off
campus, the court held that “it was reasonably foreseeable that [the student’s]
posting would reach school property.”199 Indeed, the court noted, it was “purposely
designed” to do so.200 In applying the Tinker test, the court also found that the
student’s “post created a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption to the work and
discipline of the school.”201 Thus, the school’s disqualification of the student for
running for student office was upheld.202
The Eighth Circuit also follows the foreseeability approach. In D.J.M. v.
Hannibal Public School District #60,203 a high school student in Missouri sent
instant messages from his home computer to a classmate in which he talked about
obtaining a handgun and shooting some other students at the school.204 A criminal
investigation resulted from these messages, and the student was placed in juvenile
detention.205 The school subsequently suspended the student for the rest of the school
year because the messages had a disruptive impact on the school.206 The student’s
parents challenged the suspension on constitutional grounds.207 The Eighth Circuit
held that the student’s speech was not protected speech under Tinker’s substantial
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disruption analysis.208 In applying Tinker to this online speech that was created from
home, the court cited to Wisniewski, holding that it was “reasonably foreseeable that
the instant messaging icon would come to the attention of the school authorities and
the teacher,” and that it would also “create a risk of substantial disruption within the
school environment.”209
Similarly, in S.J.W. v. Lee’s Summit R-7 School District,210 two Missouri high
school students, who were twin brothers, created a personal website that contained
a blog.211 The blog posts “contained a variety of offensive and racist comments as
well as sexually explicit and degrading comments about particular female
classmates, whom they identified by name. The racist posts discussed fights at [the
school] and mocked black students.”212 The school district suspended the students
for 180 days, but allowed them to enroll in another school for the duration of their
suspensions.213 The students’ parents challenged the suspensions in court on First
Amendment grounds.214 The Eight Circuit found that Tinker applied to the students’
off-campus blog posts because the posts were “targeted at” the school and, therefore,
“could reasonably be expected to reach the school or impact the environment.”215 It
then found that the blog posts easily met Tinker’s “substantial disruption”
standard.216
Some overlap may exist between the “nexus” approach and the “foreseeability”
approach. For example, it could easily be foreseeable that certain off-campus speech
aimed at a specific school will reach that school. However, the overlap is only
partial. In some situations, where off-campus speech is not aimed at a particular
school, it may nonetheless be foreseeable that such speech would reach the campus.
For example, a student can create social media content not aimed at a particular
school, but be on a platform where the student has many connections. In such a
situation, it may well be reasonably foreseeable that this content could spread to a
large number of people and reach the school anyway. Although this would also
satisfy the “nexus” approach by creating a link through on-campus access, the
process of arriving at the outcome would be different. Therefore, the “nexus” and
“foreseeability” approaches can provide distinct methods of determining whether or
not Tinker applies to cyberbullying that originates off campus. Like the “nexus”
approach, the “foreseeability” approach has not yet been incorporated into many
states’ anti-bullying laws. New York’s anti-bullying statute is an exception. It allows
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schools to have jurisdiction over off-campus speech “where it is foreseeable that the
conduct, threats, intimidation or abuse might reach school property.”217
E. The Identifiable Threat Approach
The final approach, which I call the “identifiable threat” approach, allows
schools to regulate off-campus speech if they are faced with an identifiable threat of
school violence.
For example, in Wynar v. Douglas County. School District,218 a high school
student in Nevada sent violent messages to some of his friends from school in which
he threatened to commit a mass shooting on a specific date.219 He wrote these
messages from his home using MySpace.220 The student’s friends became
increasingly concerned and reported these message to a football coach, who together
with the students, met with the school principal.221 The student was subsequently
suspended for ten days and, after a formal hearing, was expelled for 90 days.222 The
student’s father challenged the expulsion on First Amendment grounds.223 The Ninth
Circuit discussed the nexus and foreseeability approaches to determine how they
would apply to these facts.224 The court observed:
Given the subject and addressees of [the student’s] messages, it is hard to
imagine how their nexus to the school could have been more direct; for the
same reasons, it should have been reasonably foreseeable to [the student]
that his messages would reach campus. Indeed, the alarming nature of the
messages prompted [the student’s] friends to do exactly what we would
hope any responsible student would do: report to school authorities.225
But instead of adopting either approach, the Ninth Circuit articulated a new rule that
“when faced with an identifiable threat of school violence, schools may take
disciplinary action in response to off-campus speech that meets the requirements of
Tinker.”226 In finding that the substantial disruption test had been met, the court held
that “the school district officials reasonably could have predicted that they would
have to spend ‘considerable time dealing with [parents’ and students’] concerns and
217
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ensuring that appropriate safety measures were in place.’”227 It also applied Tinker’s
“interference with the rights of others” test, finding that since the messages
“represent the quintessential harm to the rights of other students to be secure” since
they “threatened the student body as a whole and targeted specific students by
name.”228
States with anti-bullying laws that have allowed for school regulation of offcampus speech have not relied on this approach, mostly opting for the “no
distinction” approach.
Before turning to which approaches states and their public schools should adopt
to reach off-campus cyberbullying, Part IV explores why schools should have
authority to regulate such speech in the first place.
IV. WHY SCHOOLS SHOULD REGULATE CYBERBULLYING
Some courts have expressed serious concerns about regulating their students’
off-campus speech.229 For example, in a case involving the off-campus creation of a
fake profile of a school principal, one judge noted, “It would be an unseemly and
dangerous precedent to allow the state, in the guise of school authorities, to reach
into a child’s home and control his/her actions there to the same extent that it can
control that child when he/she participates in school sponsored activities.”230 As a
general matter, this is true. However, there are three reasons that actual cases of
cyberbullying require a different analysis: (1) the nature of the harm is unique; (2)
other legal remedies are inadequate to protect victims; and (3) schools are in the best
position to protect their students.
A. Cyberbullying Is Particularly Harmful
Cyberbullying has some distinctive features from offline bullying that makes it
much more harmful. First, since cyberbullying occurs through electronic devices,
cyberbullies can reach their young victims at any time, whether or not they are in
the same physical space.231 This feature makes any rigid distinction between oncampus and off-campus speech almost inapplicable to cyberbullying. Cyberbullies
can access their targets at any time and place. Due to the ubiquity of computers,
smart phones, and social media, there is no safe haven for cyberbullying victims.232
227
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Second, the unprecedented speed in which cyberbullying content reaches
people allows for the harm to quickly reach the public without any time for the
sender to reflect on whether the content should be modified or not sent at all.233 This
speed is made possible by social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, and
electronic communication, such as email and texts. At the click of a button, harmful
content can be quickly posted online for people to see or sent directly to intended
recipients.
Third, in cyberbullying, harmful messages can reach a large audience.234 The
viewers can easily share this content with others, and the material can quickly go
“viral”—i.e., spread to a large number of users.235 The distribution of harmful
content can also be orchestrated through social media. Certain platforms, such as
Twitter, enable cyberbullies to engage in organized campaigns against a particular
person, which involve many other people—a phenomena that has been referred to
as “cyber-mobbing.”236
Fourth, bullying through social media can be viewed repeatedly. In contrast to
words uttered a single time in a physical encounter, cyberbullying’s words and
images have the potential to be viewed over and over again. Each time the victim is
confronted with the content, the victim is reinflicted with the harm.
Fifth, since many people who know the victim also know the cyberbully
through school, the cyberbully’s audience is likely to have overlapping social media
connections with the victim’s social network.237 This interconnectedness increases
233
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Amanda Todd killed herself after she continued to be cyberbullied even after she changed
schools. Her mother explained:
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the potential for humiliation because the harmful content will not just be consumed
by strangers; people who know the victim will view it as well.
Sixth, the content of social media is mostly unsupervised. Users of these
platforms feel emboldened because there is no one directing them on how to behave
online.238 Sherry Turkle writes, “These days, on social networks, we see fights that
escalate for no apparent reason except that there is no physical presence to exert a
modulating force.”239
Seventh, social media can provide a cloak of anonymity and comfort of
physical distance that encourages some young people to say things they would not
normally say when they are face-to-face with a victim.240 Moreover, when a social
media user does not have to respond to the real-time reactions of his or her audience
members, it is much easier to act out with more frequency or intensity.241 John Suler
has used the term “online disinhibition effect” to describe this phenomenon.242
Eighth, the content of cyberbullying can be enduring. Even if the content is
taken down from a website or social media platform, it may still survive through
individual viewers saving the content electronically or printing out physical copies.
Further, viewers can also use websites such as WayBack Machine243 that allow users
to access old versions of websites, even if they have been taken down.

Every time she moved schools [the cyberbully] would go undercover and
become a Facebook friend. What the guy did was he went online to the kids who
went to (the new school) and said that he was going to be a new student — that
he was starting school the following week and that he wanted some friends and
could they friend him on Facebook. He eventually gathered people’s names and
sent Amanda’s [topless] video to her new school.
Gillian Shaw, Amanda Todd’s Mother Speaks Out About Her Daughter, Bullying,
VANCOUVER SUN (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.vancouversun.com/technology/Amanda+
Todd+speaks+about+daughter+death/7384521/story.html [https://perma.cc/2KLT-GRWS].
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can be as mean as you want”).
239
TURKLE, supra note 97, at 235–36.
240
See, e.g., Jonathan Mahler, Who Spewed that Abuse? Anonymous Yik Yak App Isn’t
Telling, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/09/technology/
popular-yik-yak-app-confers-anonymity-and-delivers-abuse.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
ZFE5-2KSY] (detailing how the social media platform Yik Yak, which can be used
anonymously, has spread from colleges to high schools and how students can abuse such a
medium hidden by a veil of anonymity).
241
Suler, supra note 233, at 321.
242
Id. John Suler states six explanations for the online disinhibition effect: dissociative
anonymity, invisibility, asynchronicity, solipsistic introjection, dissociative imagination, and
minimization of authority. Id. at 322–324.
243
WAYBACK MACHINE, http://archive.org/web/ [https://perma.cc/NLS3-BTGB].
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Based on these special characteristics, cyberbullying is particularly harmful.
Social science research has shown that cyberbullying has significant impact on
adolescents’ depression, anxiety, self-esteem, emotional distress, substance use, and
suicidal behavior.244 Some studies show that young cyberbullying victims are about
twice as likely to attempt suicide compared to those who have never experienced
cyberbullying.245
In comparing offline bullying with cyberbullying, Patricia S. Strom and Robert
D. Strom argue, “Harmful [electronic] messages intended to undermine the
reputation of a victim can be far more damaging than face-to-face altercations.”246
Indeed, some studies show that students who report being cyberbullied are more
fearful of harm and avoid school more than those students who report being verbally
or physically bullied while at school.247 Data from the 2013 Crime Supplement of
the national Crime Victimization Survey show that students who report being
cyberbullied anywhere are more likely than those students who report being bullied
at school to fear attack or harm.248 They are also more likely to skip school, skip
class, avoid school activities, and avoid a specific place at school.249 Finally, they
are more likely than those reporting being bullied offline to carry a weapon to
school.250
Due to the unique and serious harm of online bullying, cyberbullying should be
given less protection than other forms of off-campus student speech. This approach
is not without precedent.251 The Supreme Court has acknowledged, “There are
244

See Charisse L. Nixon, Current Perspectives: The Impact of Cyberbullying on
Adolescent Health, 5 ADOLESCENT HEALTH, MED. & THERAPEUTICS 143, 154 (2014).
245
See, e.g., SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W. PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH
CENTER, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH SUMMARY: CYBERBULLYING AND SUICIDE 1–2
(2010), http://www.cyberbullying.us/cyberbullying_and_suicide_research_fact_sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SQ2K-S48H] [hereinafter CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH SUMMARY].
246
Strom & Strom, supra note 102, at 36.
247
See, e.g, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENT REPORTS OF BULLYING AND CYBERBULLYING: RESULTS FROM THE 2013 SCHOOL CRIME SUPPLEMENT TO THE NATIONAL CRIME
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY T-39 (2015), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2015/2015056.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FX66-5AG9].
248
Id. The report defines “bullying” as including “students being made fun of, called
names, or insulted; being the subject of rumors; being threatened with harm; being pushed,
shoved, tripped, or spit on; being pressured into doing things they did not want to do; being
excluded from activities on purpose; and having property destroyed on purpose.” Id. at T-3.
“Cyber-bullying” is defined to include “having another student post hurtful information
about the respondent on the Internet; make unwanted contact by threatening or insulting the
respondent via email, instant messaging, text messaging, or online gaming; purposefully
exclude the respondent from an online community; or purposely share private information
about the respondent on the Internet or mobile phones.” Id. at T-21.
249
Id. at T-39.
250
Id. The only outcome that is higher for students reporting to be bullied at school than
students reporting to be cyberbullied anywhere is “engaged in a physical fight.” Id.
251
See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942); see also
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certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem.”252 For example, the Court has not protected or given less protection to
“fighting words,” certain types of defamation, incitement to imminent lawless
action, “true threats,” and obscenity.253 Similarly, for the reasons given here,
cyberbullying is so harmful that it should not be given full free speech protection.
To clarify, I am not arguing for cyberbullying regulation to incorporate other
categories of constitutionally unprotected or less protected speech in order to be held
permissible.254 Instead, I am arguing that cyberbullying is so harmful in and of itself
that it should be considered a separate category of speech that is not fully protected
by the First Amendment. This lesser protection entails giving public schools the
authority to regulate cyberbullying when it originates off campus.255
B. Other Legal Remedies Are Inadequate
Courts have held that internet service providers and online interactive service
companies are not responsible for the harmful content posted by their users.256
Therefore, liability falls with the individual creators of the cyberbullying content. A
number of legal remedies can be pursued against cyberbullies. For example, many
states provide civil causes of action such as defamation; however, some legal
scholars contend that these remedies are lacking in cases of cyberbullying, mostly
because the traditional elements of these remedies fail to acknowledge the unique
nature of the digital world.257 In addition, many states also provide criminal law
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255–56 (1952).
252
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72.
253
See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
254
But see Brady, supra note 123, at 41 (arguing that legislatures should define
“cyberbullying” in a way “that is both narrowly and specifically crafted to meet one of the
current ‘unprotected’ classes of free speech and expression, including defamation, fighting
words, obscenity, speech that incites others to lawless action, and true threats”) (citations
omitted).
255
See infra Part IV.C where I argue that the regulations should primarily take the form
of restorative practices.
256
See, e.g., Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that
§ 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) “creates a federal immunity to any cause
of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a thirdparty user of the service.”); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that, under the CDA, Matchmaker.com cannot be liable for the actions of its
users).
257
See Todd D. Erb, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to Punish
Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 276–80 (2008) (analyzing the
insufficiency of civil remedies such as defamation to redress cyberbullying). But see
Papandrea, supra note 137, at 1100 (“Restricting the authority of schools to punish online
speech does not mean that the student speech goes unpunished; instead, students still would
face possible criminal prosecution and civil liability.”); Goldman, supra note 137, at 409
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protections, such as traditional stalking laws and new cyberstalking and
cyberbullying statutes.258 Some scholars have also taken issue with these laws,
mostly on First Amendment grounds.259 Thus, an adequate remedy in the courts is
uncertain, time-consuming, and expensive.260 In sum, due to the murkiness of the
legal issues involved and the high costs of litigation, these remedies seem out of
reach for most victims. On the other hand, for the reasons addressed in the next
section, schools themselves are in a better position to deal with cyberbullying than
the courts.
C. Schools Are Uniquely Situated to Regulate Cyberbullying
Schools should be given broad discretion to regulate cyberbullying for a
number of reasons. First, schools are in the best position to mediate these situations.
To be clear, I am not arguing for a return to some golden age of in loco parentis261
à la Justice Clarence Thomas in Morse.262 I have a more modest argument. I simply
(“[A]doption of the Tinker test for speech outside of school supervision is not necessary to
protect against the most troubling problems created by student speech. Speech that a
reasonable person would interpret as a threat to student or teacher safety may be disciplined
under the ‘true threat’ doctrine.”).
258
See Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, a New Crime: Evaluating the
Effectiveness of Current State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L. REV. 125, 140–47 (2007)
(analyzing how different state statutes deal with cyberstalking).
259
See id. at 135–39 (critiquing stalking and cyberstalking laws, many of which require
a “credible threat” of violence, as insufficient to address the unique problem of online
stalking); see also John O. Hayward, Anti-Cyberbullying Statutes: Threat to Student Free
Speech, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 85, 121 (2011) (arguing that the majority of criminal anti–
cyberbullying laws are a legal threat to student free speech because they ban student speech
based solely on content or viewpoint); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky and Andrea Garcia, How Not
to Criminalize Cyberbullying, 77 MO. L. REV. 693 (2012) (analyzing the First Amendment
infirmities of current cyberbullying criminal statutes and suggesting improved ways
forward).
260
See CITRON, supra note 236, at 122 (“Victims bear the costs of bringing tort . . .
claims, and those costs can be heavy. . . . Even if victims can afford to sue their attackers,
they may be reluctant to do so if their attackers have few assets.”); Erb, supra note 257, at
279 (“Since civil laws that are not likely to punish speech between adults would also not
likely punish derogatory speech posted on students’ web sites about other students, what are
parents supposed to do to protect their children from the emotional wreckage that such
comments can cause in the life of an adolescent? Civil lawsuits are expensive, and parents
have had little success using the Communications Decency Act in convincing Internet
service providers to shut down cyberbullying web sites.”).
261
See supra note 43.
262
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 419 (2007) (“In light of the history of
American public education, it cannot seriously be suggested that the First Amendment
‘freedom of speech’ encompasses a student’s right to speak in public schools. Early public
schools gave total control to teachers, who expected obedience and respect from students.”)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
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contend that schools are in a better position to identify and remediate incidents of
cyberbullying than courts. If cyberbullying is criminalized in a state,263 then courts
would have a role in its regulation. However, most states put the main onus on
schools to come up with and implement anti-bullying policies, which include
disciplinary procedures and centralized reporting requirements.264 This legislative
choice to delegate enforcement to schools is motivated by the fact that, unlike courts,
schools know who their students are, have contact with students’ parents, and
therefore have a basis for understanding the social contexts in which they are
operating. These community connections are manifested in parent-teacher meetings,
Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs),265 parent volunteer opportunities, and other
forms of shared educational process between teachers, staff, students, and parents.266
Given this knowledge of the community and individuals within it, schools should be
given the discretion to deal with those who use social media to repeatedly attack
weaker students. They are in the best position to do so.
Further, public schools should regulate cyberbullying because one of the main
purposes of these institutions is to teach students how to respectfully interact with
each other in order to preserve democratic ideals.267 The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that schools exist to “prepare pupils for citizenship in the
Republic . . . [and] inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in
themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of selfgovernment in the community and the nation.”268 In short, the Court has emphasized
that the purpose and function of schools is not just academic training, but also the
“inculcat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system.”269
263

See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.7 (2016) (defining “cyberbullying” as a crime
consisting of “the transmission of any electronic textual, visual, written, or oral
communication with the malicious and willful intent to coerce, abuse, torment, or intimidate
a person under the age of eighteen”).
264
STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS, supra note 124, at 1.
265
For a history of Parent Teacher Associations in America, see generally WILLIAM W.
CUTLER, III, PARENTS AND SCHOOLS: THE 150-YEAR STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION 4 (2000).
266
See generally Diana B. Hiatt, Parent Involvement in American Public Schools: A
Historical Perspective 1642––1994, 4 SCH. COMMUNITY J. 27, 27–28 (1994) (tracing the
devolvement of control over public education from parents to the state); Gwendolyn L.
Watson et al., Understanding Parental Involvement in American Public Education, 2 INT’L
J. HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. 41 (2012) (reviewing the literature on parental involvement in schools
in the United States).
267
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
268
Id.
269
Id. See also Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today,
education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory
school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is
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Also, schools should be given the authority to regulate cyberbullying because
they are shifting toward meaningful solutions to heal the community, and not just
excluding the wrongdoer from the learning environment.270 For example, the
Minnesota Department of Education encourages restorative justice practices in its
schools when bullying occurs.271 The Minnesota Department of Education’s website
explains, “Restorative Measures is a discipline intervention to hold students
accountable for harm, and address the needs of students or staff harmed as well as
the school community.”272 A study conducted by the Minnesota Department of
Education found that principals relied heavily on restorative justice to address
bullying behavior in their schools.273 One principal observed:
We had repeated bullying incidents on the playground perpetrated by a
small group of kids. Each class of fifth graders came to the gym where the
phy(sical) ed(ucation) teacher and I conducted a circle with the classroom
teacher. As each student used the talking piece, they were able to explain
to the kids who were causing the problems how they felt about what they
the very foundation of good citizenship.”); cf. DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE
GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM (2010) (“The central purpose of education [is] to shape
good human beings, good citizens, people of good character with the knowledge and skills
to make their way in the world and to join with others to sustain and improve our
democracy.”).
270
This is a promising approach that stands in stark contrast to the focus on harsh
punitive outcomes under the increasingly defunct “zero tolerance” policies. See W. DAVID
STEVENS, ET AL., UCHICAGO CONSORTIUM ON SCHOOL RESEARCH, DISCIPLINE PRACTICES
IN CHICAGO SCHOOLS: TRENDS IN THE USE OF SUSPENSIONS AND ARREST 6, 29 (2015),
http://ccsr.uchicago.edu/publications/discipline-practices-chicago-schools-trends-usesuspensions-and-arrests [https://perma.cc/9GSG-WFKL] (analyzing how Chicago public
schools are moving away from “zero tolerance” by doing a better job at resolving disciplinary
problems without excluding children from school); Carly Berwick, Zeroing Out Zero
Tolerance, THE ATLANTIC (March 17, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/
2015/03/zeroing-out-zero-tolerance/388003/ [https://perma.cc/YL5X-6ULN] (discussing “a
shift away from zero-tolerance school discipline toward less punitive strategies that
emphasize talking it out and resolving disputes among students to keep them in school”).
271
Restorative Practices, MINN. DEP’T EDUC., http://education.state.mn.us/MDE/dse/
safe/clim/prac/ [https://perma.cc/K6UA-7LKN]. For more detailed explanations of
restorative practices in schools, see JEANNETTE HOLTHAM, TAKING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
TO SCHOOLS: A DOORWAY TO DISCIPLINE 1–3 (2009); MARGARET THORSBORNE,
IMPLEMENTING RESTORATIVE PRACTICE IN SCHOOLS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
TRANSFORMING SCHOOL COMMUNITIES 11–17 (2013); HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK
OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 42–59 (2002).
272
Toolkit, MINN. DEP’T EDUC., http://education.state.mn.us/MDE/dse/fsce/mod/div/
Tool/ [https://perma.cc/83UQ-6EYY].
273
MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC., RESTORATIVE MEASURES IN SCHOOLS SURVEY, 2011 1
(2012), http://education.state.mn.us/MDE/dse/safe/clim/prac/index.htm [https://perma.cc/
L3J5-7ECE]. The study consisted of a 21-question survey, with 417 elementary, middle
school, and high school principals returning the survey. Id. at 2.
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were doing. We also discussed what the expectations are for student[-]to[]student and student[-]to[-]adult interactions—respect, appropriate,
responsible, etc.
The severe behavior has stopped, I think because students were
empowered to let the kids who were bullying know how they felt about
it—it was out in the open—a great place to be. Victims also realized they
were not alone—so isolation was no longer an issue either. Parents
responded very well to this intervention—and suspension was not used as
a result.274
Other states have applied restorative practices in culturally specific ways. For
example, the Hawaii Department of Education has opted to encourage school
communities to “Grow Pono” in order “to create a more welcoming and safe
environment for everyone at their school.”275 E Ola Pono is a Hawaiian term that
means “to live with respect for and in harmony with everyone and everything around
you.”276 The Hawaii Department of Education’s website explains why it adopted this
approach: “Student[-]led projects and campaigns have proven to be the most
effective and powerful initiatives to reduce harassment and bullying in schools.
Addressing this need in a culturally relevant way based on Hawaii’s host culture
provides a foundation that can benefit all people who call Hawaii home.”277
In the aftermath of bullying or cyberbullying, the Hawaii Department of
Education urges schools to find ways for the injured community to heal.278 The
website explains, “Community-wide strategies can help identify and support
children who are bullied, redirect the behavior of children who bully, and change
the attitudes of adults and youth who tolerate bullying behaviors in peer groups,
schools, families and communities.”279 This is one state’s culturally-specific
application of restorative justice principles. It addresses a serious problem with
solutions that are relevant to the people who live there. Some scholars argue that
restorative justice is so much more effective than suspension and expulsion that it
should be incorporated into anti-bullying legislation.280 For now, schools have the
274

Id. at 2.
Beyond the Classroom: Safe Schools: Anti-Bullying Work, HAW. STATE DEP’T OF
EDUC., http://www.hawaiipublicschools.org/BeyondTheClassroom/SafeSchools/Anti
BullyingWork/Pages/home.aspx [https://perma.cc/BD3R-JCTM].
276
Id.
277
Id.
278
Id.
279
Id.
280
See, e.g., Leah M. Christensen, Sticks, Stones, and Schoolyard Bullies: Restorative
Justice, Mediation, and a New Approach to Conflict Resolution in Our Schools, 9 NEV. L. J.
545, 574–78 (2009) (arguing for the incorporation of restorative practices in schools’
implementation of anti-bullying policies); Susan Duncan, Restorative Justice and Bullying:
A Missing Solution in the Anti-Bullying Laws, 37 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
267, 269 (2011) (arguing “that restorative justice practices offer a better long-term solution
275
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discretion to implement such principles in an attempt to address bullying and
cyberbullying in a holistic way.281
Moreover, schools should be the primary institutions that deal with
cyberbullying because school-age children often make bad choices that can
influence their futures and because part of the schooling process at this age is to
learn from these mistakes without being permanently penalized.282 Thus, reasonable
school discipline with a focus on restorative justice would be a much better outcome
in these situations than a juvenile criminal record or protracted civil litigation
followed by a potential settlement or civil damages award paid by a student’s family.
Finally, schools should have the power to regulate cyberbullying because
potential liability arises from civil rights laws and tort law when schools fail to
protect their students.283 Without the power to regulate, schools are put in an
impossible position, a position where they are exposed to liability for failure to
protect their students, notwithstanding the lack of discretion to adequately provide
that protection.
than criminal charges or civil actions for effectively addressing bullying”).
281
See, e.g., Patricia Leigh Brown, Opening Up, Students Transform a Vicious Cycle,
N.Y. TIMES (April 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/04/education/restorativejustice-programs-take-root-in-schools.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/D8QF-A79X] (noting
the effectiveness of restorative justice practices adopted by some New York City public
schools); Eric Westervelt, An Alternative to Suspension and Expulsion: “Circle Up!”, NPR
(Dec. 17, 2014, 3:42 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2014/12/17/347383068/analternative-to-suspension-and-expulsion-circle-up [https://perma.cc/WRM4-C3NB] (“[T]he
Oakland Unified School District [is] at the forefront of a new approach to school misconduct
and discipline. Instead of suspending or expelling students who get into fights or act out,
restorative justice seeks to resolve conflicts and build school community through talking and
group dialogue.”).
282
A serious consequence of excessive school punishment is students being funneled
into the school-to-prison pipeline. See generally DISRUPTING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON
PIPELINE 1–4 (Sofía Bahena et al. eds., 2012) (describing how the pipeline works and how to
disrupt it); CATHERINE L. KIM ET AL., THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: STRUCTURING
LEGAL REFORM 1–8 (2012) (same).
283
See, e.g., Sheli Muniz, Mother of Cyberbullying Victim to File Wrongful Death
Lawsuit, CLICKORLANDO.COM (Nov. 25, 2013, 6:24 PM), http://www.clickorlando.com/
news/mother-of-cyberbullying-victim-to-hold-news-conference/23143300 [https://perma.cc
/B8PW-V6T9] (reporting that the mother of Rebecca Sedwick “plans to file a wrongful death
lawsuit against those responsible for her daughter’s death.”); Carri Greer Thevenot, Parents
Sue School District Over Bullied Daughter’s Suicide, L.V. REV.-J. (Oct. 21, 2014, 5:21 PM),
http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/las-vegas/parents-sue-school-district-over-bullieddaughter-s-suicide [https://perma.cc/M7XB-GMCE] (reporting that parents of 13-year-old
Hailee Lamberth, who killed herself after being bullied, are suing her middle school for
wrongful death); see also Failure to Prevent Bullying Can Prove Costly to School Districts,
LEXISNEXIS
LEGAL
NEWSROOM
(May
8,
2013,
4:09
PM),
https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/litigation/b/jverdicts/archive/2013/06/28/failur
e-to-prevent-bullying-can-prove-costly-to-school-districts.aspx
[https://perma.cc/RX5NELFP] (detailing settlements and jury awards in school bullying cases across the country).
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For these reasons, schools should be given broad authority to regulate
cyberbullying, even when it originates off school grounds and is not part of any
school-sanctioned activities. However, this authority should not be limitless. Part V
outlines how schools can exercise this authority to protect their students in a way
that effectively balances students’ free speech concerns.
V. THREE SUGGESTIONS FOR SCHOOL REGULATION OF CYBERBULLYING
When states create anti-bullying laws, they need to do so in a way that
effectively balances the safety of their students with their students’ free speech
rights. This tension can be seen in a recent case that was decided by the Court of
Appeals of New York.
In People v. Marquan,284 a sixteen-year-old high school student in Albany, New
York anonymously posted, on a publicly-accessible Facebook page, descriptions of
his classmates’ alleged sexual practices and preferences, sexual partners, and other
types of personal information.285 He was criminally prosecuted for cyberbullying
under a local law, and he brought a First Amendment challenge to the statute
claiming that the law was overbroad286 and vague.287 In 2010, the Albany County
Legislature adopted a new crime for “cyberbullying,” which it defined as “any act
of communicating or causing a communication to be sent by mechanical or
electronic means, including . . . disseminating embarrassing or sexually explicit
photographs . . . or sending hate mail . . . with the intent to harass, annoy, threaten,
abuse, taunt, intimidate, torment, humiliate, or otherwise inflict significant
emotional harm on another person.”288
While acknowledging that the law “was motivated by the laudable public
purpose of shielding children form cyberbullying,” the court nonetheless struck it
down as unconstitutionally overbroad.289 It noted that “the law covers
communications aimed at adults, and fictitious or corporate entities, even though the
county legislature justified passage of the provision based on the detrimental effects
that cyberbullying has on school-aged children.”290 In sum, the court held that the
text of Albany County’s law was overbroad because it covered much more speech
284

19 N.E.3d 480 (N.Y. 2014).
Id. at 484.
286
Id. at 485 (“A regulation of speech is overbroad if constitutionally-protected
expression may be ‘chilled’ by the provision because it facially ‘prohibits a real and
substantial amount of’ expression guarded by the First Amendment.”) (citations omitted)
(quoting People v. Barton, 8 N.Y.3d 70, 75 (N.Y. 2006)).
287
Id. at 486 (“[A] statute is seen by the courts as vague if it fails to give a citizen
adequate notice of the nature of proscribed conduct, and permits arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.”) (citations omitted) (quoting People v. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d 529, 538 (N.Y.
1995)).
288
Id. at 489 (Smith, J., dissenting).
289
Id. at 488.
290
Id. at 486.
285
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than was needed to regulate cyberbullying.291 The court also noted that the County
conceded that certain terms in the statute such as “embarrassing” and “hate mail”
were vague.292 In other words, the statute failed to give a citizen adequate notice of
what was prohibited by the law. Therefore, based on both overbreadth and vagueness
grounds, the law was struck down as facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment.293
The constitutional issues in Marquan are relevant to the issues involved when
schools seek to regulate cyberbullying. Specifically, state lawmakers and school
officials must pay special attention to overbreadth and vagueness concerns when
regulating cyberbullying—particularly in (1) defining the concept; (2) defining the
school’s reach in regulating off-campus speech; and (3) applying Tinker to
cyberbullying. I will address how they should avoid some constitutional pitfalls in
the following sections.
A. Defining Cyberbullying
Most states treat cyberbullying as a subset of bullying—that is, cyberbullying
is typically defined as bullying through electronic communication or devices.294 The
definition of “bullying” has had three major components in social science literature:
(1) intent to harm; (2) repetition; and (3) an imbalance in power between the bully
and the victim.295 Some states, like Virginia, incorporate all of these elements into
their definition.296 But most states adopt only some of these elements into their anti291

Id. (“[T]he provision pertains to electronic communications that are meant to
‘harass, annoy . . . taunt . . . [or] humiliate’ any person or entity, not just those that are
intended to ‘threaten, abuse . . . intimidate, torment . . . or otherwise inflict significant
emotional harm on’ a child. In considering the facial implications, it appears that the
provision would criminalize a broad spectrum of speech outside the popular understanding
of cyberbullying, including, for example: an email disclosing private information about a
corporation or a telephone conversation meant to annoy an adult.”) (alteration in original)
(quoting Local Law No. 11 [2010] of County of Albany § 2).
292
Id. at 489 (Smith, J., dissenting).
293
Id. at 488.
294
See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900(r)(1) (West 2015) (prohibiting bullying by
“means of an electronic act”); FL. STAT. § 1006.147(2)(d) (West 2015) (prohibiting bullying
“through the use of technology or an electronic device”); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-276.01(A)
(West 2015) (“‘Bullying’ includes cyber bullying.”).
295
See Nansel et al., supra note 7, at 2094.
296
Virginia’s anti-bullying law provides:
“Bullying” means any aggressive and unwanted behavior that is intended to harm,
intimidate, or humiliate the victim; involves a real or perceived power imbalance
between the aggressor or aggressors and victim; and is repeated over time or
causes severe emotional trauma. “Bullying” includes cyber bullying. “Bullying”
does not include ordinary teasing, horseplay, argument, or peer conflict.
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bullying laws.297 However, to avoid unconstitutional overbreadth and vagueness
issues specifically in relation to regulating cyberbullying, I contend that the first two
elements, along with an expanded version of the third element, should be applied to
cyberbullying.
First, states should include an intent requirement for cyberbullying. Some
states, like Louisiana298 do, while others like California,299 do not incorporate an
intent requirement. A recent Supreme Court case that dealt with the level of proof
that is sufficient for a conviction for threatening another person through social media
is instructive insofar as it provides guidance in thinking about the proper level of
intent for criminalizing online speech. In Elonis v. U.S.,300 Anthony Elonis was
convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).301 This federal statute provides,
“Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication
containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of
another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.”302 Elonis was prosecuted for posting violent rap lyrics on Facebook about his
estranged wife.303 He was subsequently convicted and sentenced to 44 months in
prison.304 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)
required proof of subjective intent to threaten, or whether it was enough to show a
negligence standard—that is, show that a “reasonable person” would regard the
statement as threatening.305 The Court held that the trial court’s instruction that
required only negligence with respect to the communication of a threat was not
sufficient to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).306 Although the Court
VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-276.01 (West 2016).
297
Note that some states include an intent requirement, but the intent is not linked to
the harm; instead, it is linked to the behavior itself—that is, a person must have had the intent
to send the communication. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-28B-3 (2016) (defining “harassment”
as “[a] continuous pattern of intentional behavior that takes place on school property, on a
school bus, or at a school-sponsored function”); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303.1-A (2016) (“For
purposes of this article, ‘bullying’ shall mean an intentional electronic, written, verbal or
physical act, or a series of acts . . . .”). I argue that the intent requirement should be linked to
the harm, and not just the act of communicating. Compare LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.7 (2016)
(intent required), and VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-276.01 (West 2016) (intent required), with CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 2016) (intent not required).
298
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.7 (2016) (“Cyberbullying is the transmission of any
electronic textual, visual, written, or oral communication with the malicious and willful
intent to coerce, abuse, torment, or intimidate a person under the age of eighteen.”).
299
See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 2016) (“‘Bullying’ means any severe or
pervasive physical or verbal act or conduct . . . .”).
300
Elonis v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2001 (2015).
301
Id. at 2007.
302
18 U.S.C. § 875 (c) (2012).
303
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005.
304
Id. at 2007.
305
Id.
306
Id. at 2012.
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did not specify what level of proof would be sufficient—for example, recklessness
or intentional conduct—it clarified that negligence was not enough to support
Elonis’s criminal conviction.307
In states that have criminalized cyberbullying, this case suggests that
negligence is not a sufficient standard. Instead, the proof should be higher. To be
consistent with Elonis, the crime of cyberbullying should include a standard higher
than negligence. As one example, Maryland makes cyberbullying a criminal
misdemeanor, which includes “intent to harass, alarm or annoy” as an element.308
Maryland’s law is consistent with the holding of Elonis in that it requires a higher
standard than negligence in criminalizing online speech.309
Definitions of cyberbullying for school-regulation purposes should also include
an intent requirement—namely, to serve as an important limitation on schools from
regulating too much speech. For example, in Virginia, bullying, which includes
cyberbullying, means “any aggressive and unwanted behavior that is intended to
harm, intimidate, or humiliate the victim.”310 Virginia’s intent requirement makes

307
308

Id.
The elements of the crime of cyberbullying in Maryland are:

(1) A person may not maliciously engage in a course of conduct, through the use
of electronic communication, that alarms or seriously annoys another:
(i) with the intent to harass, alarm, or annoy the other;
(ii) after receiving a reasonable warning or request to stop by or on behalf of the
other; and
(iii) without a legal purpose.
(2) A person may not use an interactive computer service to maliciously engage
in a course of conduct that inflicts serious emotional distress on a minor or places
a minor in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury with the intent:
(i) to kill, injure, harass, or cause serious emotional distress to the minor;
or
(ii) to place the minor in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury.
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-805 (West 2016).
309
See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012.
310
VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-276.01 (West 2016).
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sense because it separates speech that is intended to harm from speech that is not
intended to harm311 This distinction allows Virginia to only regulate speech that is
intended to harm.
Second, the repetition element should be a required component of
cyberbullying. Like the intent element, some states require repetition in their
definitions of “bullying” and “cyberbullying,” while other states do not.312 For
example, Massachusetts defines “bullying” as “the repeated use . . . of a written,
verbal or electronic expression.”313 Similarly, “bullying” in Florida “means
systematically and chronically inflicting physical hurt or psychological distress on
one or more students.”314 Furthermore, South Dakota provides that “[b]ullying is a
pattern of repeated conduct.”315 On the other hand, in states like Oregon316 and
California,317 a single act, if severe enough, can constitute bullying and
cyberbullying. However, if a law does not include a repetition element, then it is not
distinguishing cyberbullying with single-incident “cyberattacking.”318 This
distinction is important because it has constitutional implications insofar as
broadening a school’s jurisdiction over cyberattacking and would allow schools to
regulate too much speech. Ari Ezra Waldman explains that cyberbullying should
receive different legal treatment from cyberattacking because cyberattacking is
311

Hinduja and Patchin cite an example of an unintentional act that is outside the scope
of cyberbullying:
[F]riends of a teen girl set up an online profile on Instagram where people are
asked to comment or vote for the prettiest girl among four shown. The idea is to
show their friend that she is very pretty. The profile creators stuff the virtual ballot
box so that their friend emerges victorious, not realizing that by doing so the other
three girls involved in the vote have had their feelings hurt.
HINDUJA & PATCHIN, supra note 9, at 15.
312
Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 370 (a) (West 2015) (“repeated”); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West 2016) (“systematically and chronically”), and S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 13-32-15 (2016) (“pattern of repeated conduct”), with OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
339.351 (2) (West 2016) (including a single act), and CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49800 (West 2016)
(including “an act”).
313
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 370 (West 2016).
314
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West 2016). Florida’s statute gives the following
examples of bullying: “1. Teasing; 2. Social exclusion; 3. Threat; 4. Intimidation; 5. Stalking;
6. Physical violence; 7. Theft; 8. Sexual, religious, or racial harassment; 9. Public or private
humiliation; or 10. Destruction of property.” Id.
315
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-15 (2016).
316
OR. REV. STAT. § 339.351 (2016) (defining “harassment, intimidation or bullying”
as satisfied by “any act”).
317
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 2016) (defining “bullying” as “one or more acts”
that meet certain statutory requirements).
318
See Ari Ezra Waldman, Hostile Educational Environments, 71 MD. L. REV. 705,
711–15 (2012) (differentiating cyberbullying from cyberattacking).
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much more common—and much less harmful—than cyberbullying, and treating
these two concepts the same would allow schools to have authority over too much
speech.319 Therefore, a repetition element, in conjunction with an intent element, is
important to address overbreadth and vagueness concerns.
Third, although social scientists have incorporated a power imbalance between
bully and victim as one of the defining elements of “bullying,” when applied to the
concept of “cyberbullying,” this element should take into account the special context
of online communication. For offline bullying, this power imbalance is usually
based on physical size and strength. A bully is typically a bigger and stronger student
who preys on physically weaker students.
But state legislatures have recognized that the power imbalance can also be
based on social status categories. For example, Maryland enumerates specific groups
with lower levels of power in its definition of “bullying.”320 Maryland defines
“bullying, harassment, or intimidation” as certain conduct that is “[m]otivated by an
actual or a perceived personal characteristic including race, national origin, marital
status, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, religion, ancestry, physical attribute,
socioeconomic status, familial status, or physical or mental ability or disability.”321
California prohibits “bullying based on the actual or perceived characteristics . . .
[of] disability, gender, gender identity, gender expression, nationality, race or
ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or association with a person or group with one
or more of these actual or perceived characteristics.”322 New Hampshire’s law is
more general in that it provides “‘[b]ullying’ shall include actions motivated by an
imbalance of power based on a pupil’s actual or perceived personal characteristics,
behaviors, or beliefs, or motivated by the pupil’s association with another person
and based on the other person’s characteristics, behaviors, or beliefs.”323 However,
319

[C]yberbullying should receive different legal treatment [because] some
single-incident cyberattacks are too common to merit a departure from free speech
values. When assessing the frequency and effects of cyberbullying on their test
subjects, social scientists distinguish between single incidents and repeated
patterns. Their data show that supermajorities of certain student populations have
experienced single-incident cyberattacking, but significantly fewer report the kind
of negative effects that activists and legislators have said merit a strong state or
legal response. This suggests that if single-incident cyberattacking were crowded
under the cyberbullying umbrella, there would be little conduct left outside the
reach of anti-cyberbullying regulations.
Id. at 715 (citations omitted).
320
MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424.1 (West 2016).
321
Id.
322
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 234.1 (West 2016).
323
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:3 (2016). Note that some states eschew the creation
of status-based categories based on the idea that they want to prevent certain classes of
students from receiving “special treatment.” See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 160.775(3) (West
2016) (“Each district’s antibullying policy shall be founded on the assumption that all
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due to the nature of online bullying, both physical size and strength differences and
traditional status categories hold less sway.
For online bullying, other types of factors can create power imbalances. For
example, a cyberbully’s power can arise from certain possessions, attributes, and
skills—such as possessing embarrassing information about another student,
obtaining unauthorized access to another student’s Facebook or Twitter account, or
having particular savvy with social media. A statute that narrows the categories of
power imbalance to certain status categories excludes the most relevant
characteristics that lead to the power imbalances in cases of cyberbullying.
Few states have broad enough power imbalance language to sufficiently
address the unique online context. Texas is one example of a state that does this, and
defines certain conduct as “bullying” if it “exploits an imbalance of power between
the student perpetrator and the student victim.”324 In applying this language, things
like possessing embarrassing photos of a fellow student or hacking another student’s
Facebook account, could meet this definition. In addition, with such an inclusive
definition, other potentially relevant sources of power imbalance could also be
factored in such as age, popularity, and social competence.
Other states omit the power imbalance element from their bullying regulations
altogether.325 However, I argue that states should include this element because it
creates a distinction between cyberbullying and speech that does not rise to that
level, such as peer-on-peer teasing or name-calling.326 When two students with
similar levels of power (access to information, computer skills, etc.) attack each
other online, this is not cyberbullying. This is what the Virginia anti-bullying law

students need a safe learning environment. Policies shall treat students equally and shall not
contain specific lists of protected classes of students who are to receive special treatment.”).
324
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.0832 (West 2016) (defining “bullying” as “written or
verbal expression, expression through electronic means, or physical conduct that occurs on
school property, at a school-sponsored or school-related activity, or in a vehicle operated by
the district”). However, Texas’s anti-bullying law restricts school authority to on campus
behaviors. See id.
325
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 370 (West 2016).
326
In a Title IX liability context, the Court has noted:
Indeed, at least early on, students are still learning how to interact appropriately
with their peers. It is thus understandable that, in the school setting, students often
engage in insults, banter, teasing, shoving, pushing, and gender-specific conduct
that is upsetting to the students subjected to it. Damages are not available for
simple acts of teasing and name-calling among school children, however, even
where these comments target differences in gender. Rather, in the context of
student-on-student harassment, damages are available only where the behavior is
so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it denies its victims the equal
access to education that Title IX is designed to protect.
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651–52 (1999) (emphasis added).
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refers to as “ordinary teasing, horseplay, argument, or peer conflict.”327 Further,
according to my proposed definition, students who target and attack teachers or
administrators online are not engaging in cyberbullying. When the attack is against
authority figures, instead of cyberbullying, Renee Servance refers to this as “cyberharassment,” which she defines as “the targeting of adult members of the school
community on the Internet.”328 Teachers and administrators, given their position of
authority in relation to their students, will inherently have more power than their
students. Even if there are status differences between students and teachers that favor
the students,329 the fact that school employees can discipline students necessarily
puts teachers in a position of greater power. Thus, when students attack teachers and
administrators, it is cyberharassment, not cyberbullying. In my framework,
cyberharassment occurs without regard to any power imbalances. Equally powerful
peers can cyberharass each other, less powerful peers can cyberharass more
powerful ones, and students can cyberharass teachers. While these behaviors can
still be harmful, they do not arise to cyberbullying.
Instead of combining the concepts of cyberattacking, cyberharassment, and
cyberbullying, as many states do,330 these concepts should be treated as distinct.
While cyberattacking and cyberharassment can cause harm, due to the higher degree
of injury that cyberbullying presents,331 anti-bullying laws and policies should limit
their scope to this specific form of intentional student-on-student repetitive
aggression based on power imbalances when regulating off-campus speech.
In an analysis of state anti-bullying laws, a report sponsored by the U.S.
Department of Education emphasized the distinction between harassment and
bullying by noting, “Harassment . . . is generally viewed as a subset of more broadly
defined bullying behavior. Harassment also violates federal civil rights laws as a
327

See VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-276.01 (West 2016).
Renee L. Servance, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, and the Conflict Between
Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213, 1219 (2003).
329
For example, a male student and a female teacher or a white student and an African
American teacher.
328

330

Many bullying laws enacted since 1999 were originally modeled on existing civil
rights legislation that protects groups from various forms of harassment under the
law. The legislative language used in crafting bullying laws often borrows directly
from harassment statutes. This has frequently led to a conflation of terms used to
define prohibited conduct, with ‘bullying’ and ‘harassment’ often used
interchangeably in laws, despite their important legal distinctions.
VICTORIA STUART-CASSEL ET AL., DEPT. OF EDUC., ANALYSIS OF STATE BULLYING LAWS
AND POLICIES 17 (2011), https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/bullying/state-bullyinglaws/state-bullying-laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6LM-PTRQ].
331
See supra, Part IV.A. Schools should also have authority to regulate on campus
cyberattacking and cyberharassment. However, a normative analysis of such regulation is
beyond the scope of this Article.
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form of unlawful discrimination.”332 Therefore, a clear separation of cyberbullying
and cyberharassment can provide better guidance on how schools can comply with
the separate requirements of federal civil rights laws333 and Tinker. Of particular
note, different rules apply to a school’s off-campus liability under the civil rights
statutes than would apply under Tinker. For example, Title IX would allow for
damages in cases of sexual harassment that occurs off campus if a school had
substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known sexual
harassment occurred—a standard that would not likely be met in most cases of
cyberbullying that take place off campus.334 On the other hand, both courts and state
legislatures are divided as to whether schools have any jurisdiction—and legal
responsibility—over cyberbullying that originates off campus—applying the “no
authority,” “no distinction,” “nexus,” “foreseeability,” or “identifiable threat”
approaches.
The distinction between harassment and bullying is also important because
some state antiharassment statutes have already been analyzed by courts, and they
have been found unconstitutional.335 For example, the Third Circuit in Saxe v. State
College Area School District336 struck down a public school district’s antiharassment
policy as unconstitutionally overbroad.337 Justice Alito, then a circuit judge writing
for the majority, noted, “There is no categorical ‘harassment exception’ to the First
Amendment’s free speech clause.”338 Even though some courts refuse to recognize
less constitutional protection for harassment,339 cyberbullying should be treated
differently. If defined as a form of speech not fully protected by the First
Amendment due to the special harm associated with it, schools would be enabled to
protect their most vulnerable students from intended and repeated attacks that
originate off campus while balancing the free speech rights of their students.
In summary, schools should have the authority to regulate cyberbullying that
originates off campus, but not other categories of off-campus online speech unless
it falls under another exception to the First Amendment.340
After states and schools define what “bullying” means, state laws and school
policies should be clear about what is meant by “cyberbullying,” including
nonexclusive examples of what constitutes “bullying.” For example, Massachusetts
law after defining “bullying,”341 explicitly defines “cyber-bullying” as:
[B]ullying through the use of technology or any electronic
communication, which shall include, but shall not be limited to, any
332

STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 330, at 17 (citation omitted).
See supra notes 14–16.
334
See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645 (1999).
335
See, e.g., Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214–18 (3d Cir. 2001).
336
Id.
337
Id. at 217.
338
Id. at 204.
339
See id.
340
See supra note 13–18 and accompanying text.
341
See supra note 313.
333
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transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data or intelligence of
any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photo electronic or photo optical system, including, but
not limited to, electronic mail, internet communications, instant messages
or facsimile communications. Cyber-bullying shall also include (i) the
creation of a web page or blog in which the creator assumes the identity of
another person or (ii) the knowing impersonation of another person as the
author of posted content or messages, if the creation or impersonation
creates any of the conditions enumerated in clauses (i) to (v), inclusive, of
the definition of bullying. Cyber-bullying shall also include the
distribution by electronic means of a communication to more than one
person or the posting of material on an electronic medium that may be
accessed by one or more persons, if the distribution or posting creates any
of the conditions enumerated in clauses (i) to (v), inclusive, of the
definition of bullying.342
Massachusetts’s law is effective in that it includes a definition of “cyberbullying”
with specific examples of what types of activities that can comprise it, without
limiting the definition to only those examples.343 This language can guide schools in
creating their anti-bullying policies.344

342

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 370 (2016) (emphasis added).
See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West 2016) (“‘Cyberbullying’ means
bullying through the use of technology or any electronic communication, which includes,
but is not limited to, any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic
system, photoelectronic system, or photooptical system, including, but not limited to,
electronic mail, Internet communications, instant messages, or facsimile communications.
Cyberbullying includes the creation of a webpage or weblog in which the creator assumes
the identity of another person, or the knowing impersonation of another person as the author
of posted content or messages, if the creation or impersonation creates any of the conditions
enumerated in the definition of bullying. Cyberbullying also includes the distribution by
electronic means of a communication to more than one person or the posting of material on
an electronic medium that may be accessed by one or more persons, if the distribution or
posting creates any of the conditions enumerated in the definition of bullying.”) (emphasis
added). Other states’ laws are less clear. Indiana law, for example, prohibits “cyberbullying,”
but does not define this term. See IND. CODE §§ 20-30-5.5-3, 20-33-9-0.2 (2016). Maryland
law does not mention “cyberbullying,” but prohibits “bullying, harassment, or intimidation”
by “intentional electronic communication.” MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. §7-424.1 (West 2016).
344
The Massachusetts statute mandates schools, both public and private, to “develop,
adhere to and update a plan to address bullying prevention and intervention . . . .” MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 370 (2016).
343
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Furthermore, anti-bullying policies should focus on regulating children’s
speech in order to protect other children.345 Not all do.346 This distinction also has
constitutional significance. The Supreme Court has yet to define the contours of
school authority for off-campus cyberbullying. However, the Court has
acknowledged that children generally have less free speech protection than adults.347
For example, the Court in Fraser noted that “the constitutional rights of students in
public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings. . . . ‘[T]he First Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right
to wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket.’”348 The Court also recognized
an “obvious concern on the part of parents, and school authorities acting in loco
parentis, to protect children.”349 In light of the special relationship between First
Amendment protections and children, schools should be given broad authority to
regulate cyberbullying when perpetuated by their students against other students,
even when it occurs off campus. The “nexus” and “foreseeability” approaches
framed as threshold inquiries provide limits on school authorities from regulating
too much speech.
B. Defining the School’s Reach in Regulating Cyberbullying
State laws and school policies should also contain the parameters of when
schools can regulate off-campus speech. The opposite sides of the spectrum are the
“no distinction” and “no authority” approaches. As we have seen, some states’ anti-

345

See, e.g., 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303.1-A (2016) (“bullying” means an act “directed
at another student or students”).
346
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-256 (2016) (defining bullying as “[a]ny intentional
gesture or any intentional written, verbal, electronic or physical act or threat either by any
student, staff member or parent towards a student or by any student, staff member or parent
towards a staff member”).
347
See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 215 (2003) (“The
interest in protecting young library users from material inappropriate for minors is legitimate,
and even compelling . . . .”) (Kennedy, J., concurring); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.
726, 749–50 (1978) (upholding regulation protecting children from broadcast indecency);
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (“[T]he State has an interest to ‘protect the
welfare of children’ and to see that they are ‘safeguarded from abuses . . . .’”) (quoting Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)).
348
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (quoting Thomas v.
Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F. 2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Neuman, J.,
concurring). “Cohen’s jacket” is a reference to a Supreme Court case in which the Court
overturned a man’s conviction for the crime of disturbing the peace for wearing a jacket that
displayed the phrase “Fuck the Draft” at a courthouse. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26
(1971).
349
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684. See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985)
(“Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to
educate their students.”) (Powell, J., concurring).
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bullying statutes provide very broad authority for schools.350 Massachusetts law, for
example, prohibits bullying that originates off campus “if the bullying creates a
hostile environment at school for the victim, infringes on the rights of the victim at
school or materially and substantially disrupts the education process or the orderly
operation of a school.”351 This statute takes the “no distinction” approach and treats
off-campus activity the same as on-campus activity, as long as Tinker is satisfied or
the federal civil rights law standard of “hostile educational environment” is met.352
In contrast to Massachusetts, Texas defines “bullying” as certain expression or
conduct “that occurs on school property, at a school-sponsored or school-related
activity, or in a vehicle operated by the district.”353 Unlike the Massachusetts law,
this statute only restricts speech that occurs on-campus or at school-sanctioned
activities (e.g., at a field trip or riding on a school bus).354 The legislature adheres to
the “no authority” approach and assumes that schools do not have jurisdiction to
regulate off-campus or nonschool-related speech. The problem with Texas’s law is
that schools are deemed powerless to act in the face of cyberbullying that is created
on social media platforms off campus.355 One judge highlighted the problem with
the following hypothetical situation:
With the tools of modern technology, a student could, with malice
aforethought, engineer egregiously disruptive events and, if the troublemaker were savvy enough to tweet the organizing communications from
his or her cellphone while standing one foot outside school property, the
school administrators might succeed in heading off the actual disruption
in the building but would be left powerless to discipline the student.356
Although courts have generally not applied the “no authority” approach to the Tinker
test,357 a number of courts have applied it to Fraser’s “lewd and vulgar speech”
analysis.358 Three cases are illustrative.

350

See supra Part III.B.
MASS. GEN. LAWS. Ch. 71, § 370 (2016).
352
Id.
353
TEX. EDUC. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.0832 (West 2016).
354
Id.
355
See Julieta Chiquillo, Bullying Proves a Vexing Problem for Texas Schools, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS (April 26, 2015, 10:40 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/metro/20
150426-bullying-proves-a-vexing-problem-for-schools.ece [https://perma.cc/QZ78-LM9E]
(noting the problems with Texas’s anti-bullying law because it “doesn’t address expressions
made off campus—such as videos or social media posts—that seep into school life.”).
356
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J.,
concurring).
357
See supra Part III.B–E for cases that hold that schools, in certain situations, have
authority to regulate online speech that originates off campus.
358
See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 932 (3d Cir.
2011); Layshock, 650 F.3d at 212 n.12, 216–17 nn.16–17.
351
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First, in Layshock v. Hermitage School District, a high school student in
Pennsylvania created a “parody profile” of his principal on MySpace.359 The profile
consisted of the principal’s official picture copied from the School District’s website
and a number of bogus answers to profile survey questions that were based on a
theme of “big,” because the principal is a large man.360 The student made the profile
at his grandmother’s house, while he was on her computer during nonschool
hours.361 The student gave access to the profile to other students in the school district
by listing them as “friends” on MySpace.362 The profile soon “spread like wildfire”
and “reached most, if not all, of [the school’s] student body.”363 The school
subsequently suspended the student for ten days and imposed a number of other
sanctions including banning the student from all extracurricular activities and
prohibiting the student from participating in his graduation ceremony.364 The
student’s parents filed suit in court to challenge this discipline on constitutional
grounds.365
The Third Circuit noted that the unchallenged holding of the district court was
that the student’s speech was not likely to cause a substantial disruption under
Tinker.366 It, therefore, focused its attention on whether or not this off-campus
speech was covered by Fraser.367 The school made the following arguments: (1) a
sufficient nexus exists between the vulgar profile and the school; (2) the speech
initially began on campus because the student was enrolled in school and copied the
principal’s photograph from a school website; and (3) it was reasonably foreseeable
359
360

Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207–08.
Id. at 208.

For example, Justin answered “tell me about yourself” questions as follows:
Birthday: too drunk to remember
Are you a health freak: big steroid freak
In the past month have you smoked: big blunt
In the past month have you been on pills: big pills
In the past month have you gone Skinny Dipping: big lake, not big dick
In the past month have you Stolen Anything: big keg
Ever been drunk: big number of times
Ever been called a Tease: big whore
Ever been Beaten up: big fag
Ever Shoplifted: big bag of kmart
Number of Drugs I have taken: big.
Id.

361

Id. at 207.
Id. at 208.
363
Id.
364
Id. at 210.
365
Id.
366
Id. at 214.
367
Id. at 216–217.
362

2016]

EXPANDING THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE

881

that the profile would come to the attention of the school.368 Rejecting all three
arguments, the Third Circuit then held that under Fraser, the school did not have the
authority to punish the student for this off-campus speech, even if it was lewd and
vulgar.369
Second, in J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, even though the Third Circuit
applied Tinker to a student’s off-campus creation of a fake profile of the school’s
principal under the “no distinction” approach, it did not extend the same reach to
Fraser.370 The court noted, “Fraser’s ‘lewdness’ standard cannot be extended to
justify a school’s punishment of [a student] for use of profane language outside the
school, during non-school hours.”371 The court cautioned, “Under this standard, two
students can be punished for using a vulgar remark to speak about their teacher at a
private party, if another student overhears the remark, reports it to the school
authorities, and the school authorities find the remark ‘offensive.’”372
Finally, in J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, the Court applied Tinker
because it found a “sufficient nexus” between the “Teachers Sux” website and the
school,373 and the Court refused to apply Fraser because “the circumstances before
us are also not on all fours with Fraser.”374 The Court noted, “Certainly, the speech
at bar could be considered lewd, vulgar and offensive. It was not, however,
expressed at any official school event or even during a class, subjecting unsuspecting
listeners to offensive language.”375
In explaining the difference between Tinker and Fraser as applied to offcampus speech, Mary-Rose Papandrea contends that courts are reluctant to apply
Fraser because a school would only have to show, under Fraser, that the speech was
lewd or offensive, and this would give schools too much regulatory authority.376
However, Tinker’s analysis—i.e., proving a forecast of substantial disruption or
interference with the rights of others—creates a significant check against the almost
368

Id. at 214.
Id. at 216.
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371
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Papandrea, supra note 137, at 1070 (“[C]ourts are more reluctant to apply Fraser to
off-campus speech than Tinker because at least Tinker requires a showing that the expression
disrupted or could reasonably be expected to disrupt school activities; Fraser does not. In
other words, courts must recognize that even if they conclude that the Tinker test applies to
off-campus speech, that test still requires schools to meet the substantial disruption standard
prong of Tinker. . . . Fraser, in contrast, does not require the school to make any showing
that the offensive language disrupted the school’s activities; as a result, schools could restrict
any indecent speech by a student, anywhere regardless of where he engages in it, without
any additional showing. The idea that schools could regulate offensive speech on the Internet
without showing any harm to the school would give school officials almost limitless
authority to police their students’ expression.”) (citations omitted).
369

882

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

unlimited school authority that would be absent if Fraser applied to off-campus
speech. In addition to this check, adding a “nexus” and/or “foreseeability” threshold
requirement before applying the Tinker test would create another limitation on
school power to regulate off-campus speech.377
In a recent case, Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools,378 the Fourth Circuit
utilized the “nexus” and “foreseeability” approaches in a situation involving a
student attacking another student online.379 In Kowalski, a high school student in
West Virginia was suspended for creating a MySpace webpage from her home that
ridiculed a fellow student.380 The webpage was called “S.A.S.H.,” which the student
claimed stood for “Students Against Sluts Herpes.”381 Another student testified
during a deposition that the acronym really stood for “Students Against Shay’s
Herpes,” referring to another student, Shay N.382 The webpage’s creator invited
approximately 100 people on her Myspace “friends” list to join the discussion group
and approximately two dozen students from her high school joined.383 The members
of the discussion group posted comments, accusing Shay N. of having herpes and
being a “whore.”384 Shay N.’s father learned about this website and met with school
officials to file a complaint. School officials concluded that the student had created
a “hate website, in violation of the school policy against harassment, bullying, and
intimidation.”385
West Virginia’s anti-bullying law, which was enacted in 2001 and in effect
when the student created the website, required each county board to develop and
implement an anti-bullying policy “prohibiting harassment, intimidation or bullying
of any student on school property or at school sponsored events.”386 This state law
adopted the “no authority approach.” That is, it viewed schools without authority to
regulate off-campus speech.

377

I do not advocate for the “identifiable threat” approach as a stand-alone option
because I believe it would not allow schools to regulate most cases of cyberbullying, where
verbal and psychological aggression are present, but do not rise to the level of identifiable
threat of school violence. See Daniel Marcus-Toll, Note, Tinker Gone Viral: Diverging
Threshold Tests for Analyzing School Regulation of Off-Campus Digital Student Speech, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 3395, 3432 (2014). However, it could be added to the legal framework
that I advocate for in this Article to ensure that such threats are clearly covered under a
school’s regulatory authority.
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The student who created the website was suspended for ten days, which was
later reduced to five days.387 She was also given a ninety-day “social suspension,”
which prevented her from attending some school events.388 Consistent with the
legislature’s mandate,389 the high school adopted a “no authority” approach in its
anti-bullying policy.390 Specifically, the Student Handbook prohibited “any form of
. . . sexual . . . harassment . . . or any bullying or intimidation by any student . . .
during any school-related activity or during any education-sponsored event,
whether in a building or other property owned, use[d] or operated by the Berkeley
Board of Education.”391
Relying on the language contained in the school’s own policy, the student
challenged her discipline on First Amendment grounds.392 She argued that the school
had no authority to regulate her online speech that took place at her home after
school hours.393 In upholding the school’s discipline, the court imposed an additional
threshold requirement in both the “nexus” and “foreseeability” approaches in
determining whether Tinker applied to this off-campus speech.394 The Fourth Circuit
first applied the foreseeability analysis and observed that, although the student
“pushed her computer’s keys in her home, . . . she knew that the electronic response
would be, as it in fact was, published beyond her home and could reasonably be
expected to reach the school or impact the school environment.”395 The court held:
“To be sure, it was foreseeable in this case that [the student’s] conduct would reach
the school via computers, smartphones, and other electronic devices, given that most
of the ‘S.A.S.H.’ group’s members and the target of the group’s harassment were
[students at the same school].”396
The court also applied the nexus approach, noting that it was “satisfied that the
nexus of [the student’s] speech to [the high school’s] pedagogical interests was
sufficiently strong to justify the action taken by school officials in carrying out their
role as the trustees of the student body’s well-being.”397 The court analyzed the
nexus as between the speech and the school’s interest in maintaining a safe learning
environment. However, a physical connection between the speech and the campus
itself was also present. First, the student directed her webpage to fellow students at
her school.398 Additionally, students accessed it at the school,399 and the target’s
387
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father brought a printed copy of the webpage onto the school.400 The Fourth Circuit,
after determining that Tinker applied, upheld the school’s discipline because the
student’s expression “created ‘actual or nascent’ substantial disorder and disruption
in the school.”401
It is important to note that even though the state legislature enacted a “no
authority” approach and the school adopted the same for its student handbook, a
court enabled this school greater leeway in regulating cyberbullying speech created
off campus. Specifically, it imposed an additional threshold—consisting of the
nexus and foreseeability approaches—before applying Tinker in order to uphold
school discipline for off-campus speech.402 This highlights a promising direction that
would allow schools to have an active role in regulating cyberbullying speech that
is created off campus, while giving due consideration to students’ constitutional
rights. Some states’ legislatures are moving in this direction.403 More should
follow.404

accessed first by [high school] student Ray Parsons at 3:40 p.m., from a school computer
during an after hours class.”).
400
Id. at 568.
401
Id. at 574.
402
Id. at 573.
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See supra text accompanying notes178–182 and 217 and accompanying text.
404
Naomi Goodno proposes the following model language:
The school shall have jurisdiction to prohibit cyberbullying that originates off
the school’s campus if:
(i) it was reasonably foreseeable that the electronic communication would
reach the school’s campus; or
(ii) there is a sufficient nexus between the electronic communication and the
school which includes, but is not limited to, speech that is directed at a
school-specific audience, or the speech was brought onto or accessed on the
school campus, even if it was not the student in question who did so.
Naomi Harlin Goodno, How Public Schools Can Constitutionally Halt Cyberbullying: A
Model Cyberbullying Policy that Considers First Amendment, Due Process, and Fourth
Amendment Challenges, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 697 (2011).
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C. Applying Tinker to Cyberbullying
Once a court determines that Tinker applies because of a sufficient nexus to
campus or a reasonable foreseeability of reaching campus, it should then apply at
least one, and perhaps both, of the Tinker standards. Specifically, Tinker asks if the
student speech: (1) “would substantially interfere with the work of the school” or (2)
“impinge on the rights of other students.”405 If the answer to either question is in the
affirmative, then a school can regulate the speech.
Under the first test, I contend that the way some courts have defined
“substantial disruption” creates too high a standard for cases of cyberbullying. For
example, a federal trial court in Missouri found no substantial disruption in a case
where students accessed a student’s webpage that used vulgar language to attack
school officials in the school’s library and during a computer class, but there was no
disturbance in either the library or the class.406 Additionally, a federal trial court in
California, in a case involving a student who was punished for posting a video
containing derogatory comments about a thirteen-year-old student to YouTube,
overturned the student’s two-day suspension noting that “to allow the School to . . .
suspend a student simply because another student takes offense to her speech,
without any evidence that such speech caused a substantial disruption of the school’s
activities, runs afoul of Tinker.”407 These lower courts view substantial disruption as
something that must affect more than one student to be present. This high standard,
however, would fail to protect a victim of cyberbullying. Todd Erb explains:
Bullies naturally pick on weak individuals rather than large numbers of
students. The effects of bullying may be excruciating to bear for that
individual, but the rest of the student body may not even know about the
bullying, much less feel its effects. Since bullying is often
“individualized,” there is a diminished chance that cyberbullying incidents
will cause a “substantial or material disruption” to the school environment.
It may cause a “substantial or material disruption” to one student’s
learning environment, but such a disruption would most likely fail the high
standard . . . .408
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Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). Other
cases haves suggested an expansive interpretation of Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393
(2007). See, e.g., Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2007); Nuxoll
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this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
406
Beussink ex rel Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177–
78 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
407
J.C. ex rel R.C. v. Beverley Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1117
(C.D. Cal. 2010).
408
Erb, supra note 91, at 274.

886

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

In other words, in many cases of cyberbullying, a court looking for a student’s
speech to cause substantial disruption to an entire school building, classroom, or
general school environment would not likely find it.
In contrast, I argue that substantial disruption should be defined in the context
of cyberbullying as focusing on the disruption to the victim’s educational
experience. This is the better approach, and it is not without precedent. In Kowalski
v. Berkeley County Schools, for example, the court focused on the disruption to the
cyberbullied victim’s educational experience in finding that substantial disruption
occurred. It observed that she had to miss school in order to avoid further abuse and
warned there might have been a “snowballing effect” of worsening harassment if the
school had not intervened.409 In an analogous case, J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School
District, upholding the school’s punishment of a student, the court described “the
most significant disruption”410 as the harm that the student caused to an algebra
teacher by creating a webpage about her.411
Under the second test, which has not been heavily relied on by courts,412 a
school would need to show that student speech interfered with the rights of others in
order to regulate it.413 In one of the few cases that has applied this test, Harper v.
Poway Unified School District,414 a high school prohibited a student from wearing a
T-shirt that had the words “BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT
GOD HAS CONDEMNED” handwritten on the front, and “HOMOSEXUALITY
IS SHAMEFUL” handwritten on the back.415 In upholding the school’s authority to
do this, the court relied on Tinker’s second test.416 It held:
We conclude that [the student’s] wearing of his T-shirt “colli[des] with the
rights of other students” in the most fundamental way [citing Tinker, at
508]. Public school students who may be injured by verbal assaults on the
basis of a core identifying characteristic such as race, religion, or sexual
orientation, have a right to be free from such attacks while on school
campuses.417
The Ninth Circuit then cited research that showed the psychological and educational
harm that young gay and lesbian students experienced as a result of verbal and

409
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physical abuse at school.418 The court concluded that “the School had a valid and
lawful basis for restricting [the student’s] wearing of his T-shirt on the ground that
his conduct was injurious to gay and lesbian students and interfered with their right
to learn.”419 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Alex Kozinski warned that such a broad
application of Tinker’s second test could eliminate free speech rights at schools.420
He argued that opposing homosexuality is just one side of a controversial debate
and, thus, should be protected.421 The majority, however, did not see it this way.
Instead, it noted:
Such disagreements may justify social or political debate, but they do not
justify students in high schools or elementary schools assaulting their
fellow students with demeaning statements: by calling gay students
shameful, by labeling black students inferior or by wearing T-shirts saying
that Jews are doomed to Hell.422
The court further noted:
To say that homosexuality is shameful is to say, necessarily, that gays and
lesbians are shameful. There are numerous locations and opportunities
available to those who wish to advance such an argument. It is not
necessary to do so by directly condemning, to their faces, young students
trying to obtain a fair and full education in our public schools.423
This application of the “interference with the rights of others” test should be applied
to cases of cyberbullying, as either an alternative to the “substantial disruption” test
or in conjunction with it. Just as the gay and lesbian students were harmed by the
message on the shirts, the victims of cyberbullying are harmed by the messages of
their attackers. Schools should not be forced to sit idly by while their most powerless
students are being injured. The court in Harper recognized, “Those who administer
418
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our public educational institutions need not tolerate verbal assaults that may destroy
the self-esteem of our most vulnerable teenagers and interfere with their educational
development.”424 Cyberbullying victims are also vulnerable. By the definition of
“cyberbullying” that I advocate for here, which includes a power imbalance element,
this must be the case. Their educational rights should not be allowed to be interfered
with by those with more power who intentionally try to harm them over and over
again.
CONCLUSION
Cyberbullying has received increasing societal attention in the aftermath of the
tragic suicides of some of its youngest and most vulnerable victims.425 In this Article,
I have argued that cyberbullying is so harmful, in and of itself, that it should be
afforded diminished First Amendment protections. I have also advocated for a
narrow definition of cyberbullying that incorporates the three elements of the
prevailing social scientists’ definition of “bullying” as it relates to cyberbullying: (1)
intent to harm; (2) repetition; and (3) power imbalance between cyberbully and
victim.
In addition, many cases of cyberbullying have involved harmful student
expression created off campus—for example, a derogatory website or insulting
Facebook posts made at home or threatening emails and texts sent from smartphones
miles away from school. Most state laws do not allow their primary or secondary
schools to regulate this type of expression because it did not occur at school or at a
school-sanctioned event. These states adopt a “no authority” approach in regulating
off-campus speech. However, this approach leaves schools powerless in the face of
the serious harm created by cyberbullying that originates off campus. Some states
adopt a “no distinction” approach, treating the regulation of on-campus and offcampus speech the same as long as they meet the substantial disruption test of Tinker
v. Des Moines.426 However, this approach does not adequately address students’ free
speech rights because there is no check on the school’s power to regulate student
speech when it occurs off campus.
In order to provide schools with the authority to protect their students from
cyberbullying and also to incorporate a check on such power, I have proposed an
alternative to the “no authority” and “no distinction” approaches. Specifically, I have
urged that schools adopt a “nexus” or “foreseeability” approach to regulate
cyberbullying that originates off campus. The Fourth Circuit has applied these two
approaches in analyzing the constitutionality of the disciplinary actions of school
officials in situations where students used social media to attack or threaten other
students.427 For this court, schools can regulate off-campus student speech if there is
a nexus between the speech and the campus—for example, the creator of a website
424
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aims the site at a specific school by sending invites to the school’s students to view
it or someone accesses the site on campus. In the alternative, schools have regulatory
authority if it is reasonably foreseeable that the off-campus speech will reach
campus. The “nexus” and “foreseeability” approaches effectively balance the
competing interests of protecting cyberbullying victims and protecting students’ free
speech rights.
Finally, I have urged that the Tinker analysis be tailored to cases of
cyberbullying insofar as the “substantial disruption” test is focused on the victim
and not the total school environment, and, in the alternative or along with the
“substantial disruption” test, the “interference with the rights of others” test be
applied in these situations.
In these ways, schools can effectively balance the protection of their most
vulnerable students from a particular type of serious harm with their students’ free
speech rights.

